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ABSTRACT
Risk management has gained a significant amount of attention from both policy makers and
the public over the past thirty years, as the interaction of technology and policy choices
become more predominant in the evaluation of trade-offs in a democratic society. This is
particularly so in decisions regarding the management, disposal and clean up of hazardous
wastes throughout the United States. The responsible agency must balance the multiple
elements of risk, multiple and conflicting objectives, and stakeholder values and perceptions
inherent in environmental decisions in order to meet social needs, while maintaining the
integrity of both the technical and social aspects of that decision.
The National Research Council (1996) has recommended that the responsible agency
incorporate all relevant stakeholders in the decision making process from the start,
specifying an analytical-deliberative process for dealing with decisions that involve
substantial risk analysis and assessment. The basic premise of this recommendation is that
by involving the stakeholders in the process from the beginning and simultaneously
performing the necessary risk assessments, taking into account the stakeholder values in an
analytic-deliberative method, the decision making process can be enhanced.
The concept of bringing together multiple stakeholders in environmental decision making
attempts to address the fact that past decisions have neglected stakeholder values, however,
by bringing together the multiple stakeholders, the agency is faced with numerous other
challenges. These challenges include:: communicating and characterizing risk, unreasonable
expectations, selecting of stakeholders, utilizing of time and resources efficiently, providing
access to resources, addressing stakeholder concerns, and defining consensus.
In order to aid in this process, this work investigates the integration of risk assessment and
stakeholder involvement in reaching a fair, wise, efficient and stable decision concerning
environmental remediation. We propose an integration of stakeholder values and risk
assessments using a combination of mathematical and decision analysis tools which
culminate in a ranking of the remediation alternatives. From this integration, we devise
strategies for a consensual deliberation that focus on the interests of the stakeholders while
simultaneously account for the technical issues. This work presents the results of such an
integration and details the formulation of strategies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
"It is not enough that you should understand about applied science in order
that your work may increase man's blessing. Concern for the man himself
and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical
endeavors...never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and equations."
Albert Einstein, 1931.
Introduction
Risk management has gained a significant amount of attention from both policy makers
and the public over the past thirty years, as the interaction of technology and policy choices
become more predominant in the evaluation of trade-offs in a democratic society. This is
particularly so in environmental decisions regarding the management, disposal and clean
up of hazardous wastes throughout the country. Environmental decisions are laden with a
myriad of risks and values which possess different connotations for individuals. While
balancing the multitude of objectives in order to meet social needs, policy makers and the
responsible parties are faced difficult choices which must maintain the integrity of both the
substance, technical integrity, and process, social fairness, of that decision. Trade-offs
amongst incompatible measures such as environmental resources, technologies, health
impacts, cultural resources and lands, religion and costs must be made.
1.1 The Department of Energy
The Department of Energy (DOE) currently has over 2000 contaminated facilities that will
require clean up and decommissioning. In facing these challenges, it has realized that
decisions must be made in collaboration with the public. For the last 50 years, DOE has
invested $300 billion in developing a nuclear weapons complex that it is now faced with the
clean up and remediation of both radiological and hazardous waste sites (DOE, 1995). By
1995, approximately $23 billion was spent on the identification and characterization of its
wastes and, it is estimated that over the next 75 years, an additional $250-300 billion will
be required for the remediation of such sites (DOE, 1997). The Environmental
Management Program has defined six goals in regards to the clean up process, as stated by
former Assistant secretary Thomas P. Grumbly, they are:
* Eliminate and manage urgent risks in the system
* Emphasize health and safety for workers and the public
* Establish a system that is managerially and financially in control
* Demonstrate tangible results
* Focus technology development on identifying and overcoming obstacles to
progress
* Establish a stronger partnership between DOE and its stakeholders (DOE,
1995)
Furthermore environmental restoration decisions at DOE facilities are subject to federal
and state laws which mandate specific remediation procedures; specifically, there are two
main federal statutes which require public participation in the decision making process:
CERCLA: the Comprehensive Response and Compensation And Liability Act, passed in
1980, which ensures the location and remediation of hazardous waste sites throughout the
country, and the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, which requires all facilities
which generate, treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes to obtain permits. Ideally,
these laws permit the public to document and discuss its concerns about the range of
activities at the DOE facilities, however, often participation comes too late in the decision
making process and leads to opposition from the affected parties. Although the
Department of Energy has full legal responsibility for the decisions made at its hazardous
waste site, the Agency must however take into account public comment and
recommendations when implementing an alternative for remediation thus, the more
substantiated the public or stakeholder recommendation, the more likely DOE is to
implement it.
1.2 Risk Analysis and Stakeholder Values
Risk analysis methods for identifying the impact and consequences of an activity in order
to help the decision maker assess the situation and choices to reach a substantiated
conclusion, have fallen to criticism for their inability to address the often non quantifiable
concerns of the stakeholders: cultural, ethical and moral values. Decision making methods
have separated risk management and assessment, focusing either too much on one aspect
or the other thereby contributing to a disconnect between the decision maker (agency) and
the public. The affected and interested parties, the stakeholders, feel that their values and
objectives have been neglected; they feel that the decision has not been arrived at in a fair
process. Their opposition may rest on misperceptions of the risks involved, the omission of
necessary input, be it science or values, or a lack of trust in the agency. Stakeholders may
take issue with the type of analyses conducted, the subject of the analyses, the definition of
the problem or the methodology used. Although the responsible agency has made many
decisions for the social "good" claiming "objectivity " based in risk assessment, the
resolution has often been contested by the affected parties. Neglecting stakeholder values,
oversimplifying assumptions and obscuring key contributors leads to an inaccurate
analysis and resolution which perpetuates poor risk characterization and the lack of trust
in the agencies. In the end, the decision itself is questioned either through the media,
public opposition, or litigation.
In order to fill this void, the National Research Council (1994) has recommended that the
respective decision maker (governmental agency), incorporate all relevant stakeholders in
the decision making process from the start. The National Research Council recommends an
analytical-deliberative process for dealing with decisions that involve substantial risk
analysis and assessment. In making decisions concerning the environment, the objectives,
trade-offs, uncertainties, risks and nonobjective judgments must be made explicit. Hiding
these elements behind science or the guise of national security only results in unwise and
inefficient decisions that lack support of the affected community. Risk analyses, analytic
techniques used to understand risk, need to be utilized in conjunction with input from the
affected parties so that assumptions underlying the evaluation are clarified, understood
and validated.
The basic premise of this recommendation and the goal of the DOE is that by involving the
stakeholders in the process from the beginning and simultaneously performing the
necessary risk assessments, taking into account the stakeholder values, the decision
making process can be enhanced and the previous failings and causes for mistrust
overcome.
The concept of bringing together multiple stakeholders in environmental decision making
seems to address the fact that past decisions have neglected stakeholder values, however,
by bringing together the multiple stakeholders interested in or affected by the decision, the
agency is faced with numerous other challenges, including: communicating and
characterizing risk, unreasonable expectations (on the part of all or some parties),
selecting of stakeholders, utilizing of time and resources efficiently, providing access to
resources, addressing stakeholder concerns, and defining consensus.
In order to aid in this process, this work investigates the integration of risk assessment
and stakeholder involvement in reaching a fair, wise, efficient and stable decision
concerning the remediation of hazardous waste sites. We propose an integration of
stakeholder values and risk assessments using a combination of mathematical and decision
analysis tools which culminate in a ranking of the remediation alternatives. From this
integration, we devise strategies for a consensual deliberation that focus on the interests of
the stakeholders while simultaneously account for the technical issues. This work presents
the results of such an integration and details the formulation of strategies.
With regards to this investigation, the purpose of this work is to :
i. Develop and test an integration methodology through a deliberation
ii. Examine the role of deliberation in addressing the risk laden issues in environmental
decision making
1.2.1 The Methodology
This project is a multifaceted approach to stakeholder involvement and risk analysis in
environmental restoration decisions. It aims to develop a formal risk management
methodology for decision making regarding the clean up of the Hazardous Waste Site that
will successfully integrate the stakeholders' concerns and the technical analyses of the site,
with explicit consideration of the uncertainties. Ultimately, the methodology will produce
a systematic, traceable, defensible and acceptable approach for use by the Department of
Energy. This work reports on the structure and results of such a deliberation. Six
Remedial Action Alternatives (RAAs) were considered by six stakeholders representing the
public, the site owner, and regulatory agencies (state and city). The fundamental
objectives defined by the stakeholders are grouped into six categories: Programmatic Risks,
Life Cycle Costs, Socioeconomic Impacts, Cultural Impacts, Environment, and Human
Health and Safety. Fourteen Performance Measures (PM) were defined to represent these
objectives. Risk Assessments were conducted to evaluate the numerical impact of each
RAA on each PM. Using relative importance weights that were derived for each PM from
stakeholder input (via the Analytic Hierarchy Process), the RAAs were ranked in order of
preference for each stakeholder. Furthermore, the principal contributors to each
stakeholder's ranking were determined from the analysis. From this point the deliberation
began - from pre-deliberation and planning through the interaction between the
stakeholders.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter Two provides a description of the site and the stakeholders involved in the
process. Chapter Three discusses the multiple dimensions of risk which contribute to the
complexity of environmental decision making. It also explores the need for a deliberative
process when dealing with issues of risk. Chapter Four describes the Integration
Methodology used, and the results that are the foundation of the deliberation proposals.
Chapter Five discusses the issues of fairness and efficiency in a social decision making
process, elaborating on the challenges of achieving both elements. Chapter Six describes
deliberation in the context of environmental decision making, involving multiple
stakeholders and risk. It presents the preparation and design of deliberation from the
integration results discussed in Chapter Four. The goals, interactions of participants and
risk communication issues are discussed here as well.
Then in Chapter Seven, conclusions concerning the integration methodology as an aid to
deliberation, as a method for communication and characterization of risks and as a mode to
involve stakeholders. Furthermore, the deliberation in terms of its usefulness in risk
characterization and stakeholder involvement is examined. Lastly, we present a summary
of the lessons learned and how agency decision makers may use this method in the future.
CHAPTER 2: PROJECT OVERVIEW
"There is no such thing as objective risk." Paul Slovic, 1994
This Chapter presents an overview of the project, detailing each component integrated into
the framework for a consensual deliberation. The purpose of this overview is to provide the
reader with a general sense and background of the project to establish a decision making
method for DOE and the role of deliberation in this decision making process. Although it
is not necessary to understand each component in depth, a context is needed in which to
place the deliberation.
2.1 The Site
The site chosen for the development of this methodology is the Chemical Waste
Landfill(CWL) which is located at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. It was selected by the Team 1 in consultation with the Department of Energy and
chosen to be the testbed for methodology development. Since the decision situation is a
prototypical situation, the problem definition is simplified. This infers that while the final
recommendation reached by the stakeholders may not be applicable or used by DOE, the
integration methodology and use in deliberation can provide interesting insight into the
communication and characterization of risk in decision making.
The site is a 1.9 acre site where disposal of waste persisted from 1962 until 1985, when
waste management activities were initiated. The Chemical Waste Landfill is located 4
miles from the nearest drinking well and 3 miles from the nearest spring. The sediment
make up of the CWL is primarily a mixture of limestone, quartz, granite and metamorphic
1 The "Team" consists of the sub contract groups to whom the project was granted, i.e., the risk analysts,
stakeholder involvement specialists and the decision integration ...
clast sands and gravel. The base sediments were deposited by alluvial (earthen) and
fluvial action. The water table at the site is located 490 feet below the surface. The
underlying media is heterogeneous sequence of unconsolidated to semi-consolidated lenses
and sheets of cobbles, gravels, sands, slits and clays. The waste consisted of PCB's,
chlorinated organics, cyanide, acetone, hydrocarbons, aluminum, ammonia oxides,
beryllium and other miscellaneous debris. The wastes were separated and buried according
to their physical and chemical properties, following which they were buried in pits ranging
from 8 to 12 feet deep and at minimum 2 feet wide. One unlined and one line chromic acid
pit are located on the site. The former is a 23 ft by 66 ft by 7 ft deep pit situated in the
southwest quadrant of the CWL, used for the disposal of chromic acid waste from the early
1970's to 1978. The latter, is a 15ft by 15ft ft by 5ft deep pit near the south if the CWL and
was used between 1979 and 1982 for disposing of liquid chromic acid and ferric chloride
wastes. Once capacity of a given waste pit was reached, a new pit was dug and given the
same identification number of the previous pit. Subsequently, accurate specifications
concerning the location of each type of waste do not exist.
In 1992, the site was investigated as a potential RCRA (Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act) site. Prior to this investigation, site characterization activities had begun in
1985 and from 1985 -1992, twelve monitoring wells were installed. The Voluntary
corrective measures (VCM) ensued in order to reduce sources driving ground water
contamination and to eliminate health and environmental risk pathways. The three
VCM's are vapor extraction, focused excavation and landfill wide excavation. They intend
to reduce the uncertainties associated with the final site remediation. Upon the completion
of the VCM's, site characterization has shown the two primary pollutants of concern to be
trichloroethelyne and chromium, both of which have characterized as toxic by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For the purposes of this prototype project, the
these two elements have been selected as the subject of evaluation in the risk assessment
and characterization phase of the project.
2.2 The Risk Assessment
The risk assessment component will be conducted in consultation with the stakeholders.
First, the stakeholders define the primary objective categories, then a method of actually
measuring how a given alternative (remedial action alternative (RAA)) performs in that
objective category is determined by the analysts.2 This measure is referred to as a
performance measure (PM); they have been agreed upon by the stakeholders . An
influence diagram, devised by both the analysts and stakeholders helps to guide the
evaluation process and tries to ensure that all parties are aware of the inputs and
analyses. The PMs, listed in Table 2.1, consist of such things as: Contaminated Media
Quantity, Disposal, Transportation. For each PM, the alternatives are evaluated for the
corresponding risk. Thus for each performance measure, the risk analysis shows the way
in which a given alternative performs. This outcome is a probabilistic outcome and
accordingly, there are different levels of uncertainty regarding the assessment.3
Programmatic Assumptions
Life Cycle Cost
Socio-economic Issues
Cultural, Archeological and
Historic (CAH) Resources
Environment
Minimize Waste
Minimize Direct Costs
Promote Community
Quality of Life
Promote Environmental
Justice
Protect CAH Resources
Protect Environmental
Resources
Quantity of ER Waste Generated
Implementation Costs
Completion Costs
Changes in Ambient Conditions
Impact on Local Economy
Compare Total Population Health Effects
Number Impacted/Severity of Impacts
Contaminant Concentration
2 The process of risk assessment has numerous technical aspects. It is the opinion of the author that the
technical components should be rephrased in common language and not withheld from the stakeholders, but
provided in an overview format, with details available if desired.
3 This uncertainty is the parameter uncertainty commonly used in risk assessment techniques. For more
information, please consult Apostolakis, 1991.
Worker Health and Safety
Minimize Risk to Public
Health and Safety
Minimize Risk to Worker
Health and Safety
Individual Health Risk
Individual Worker Health Risk
Table 2.1: Objective Categories and Performance Measures
Prior to the risk analyses, the stakeholders were shown an approximation of how the risk
assessment occurs and the assumptions made. Their input was noted and considered by
the analysts.
2.3 The Stakeholders
The stakeholders were selected for participation based on the broad definition that a
stakeholder is any person or organization that may have a stake in the consequences of a
particular decision. At the CWL, based on input from sponsors and review of site relevant
information, the project facilitator team compiled a preliminary list of stakeholders who
might participate in the project. From an initial interview base of 48 participants
representing x organizations, 12 stakeholders were selected to participate in the project.4
The following organizations were represented:
* DOE and Sandia National Labs
* Citizens Advisory Board Members
* Corrective Action Management Unit Working Group members5
* Local, state and federal officials
* Regulatory organizations
* Native American Nations
* Business and Community Leaders
4 The issue of stakeholder selection is complex. This methodology focuses primarily on the decision making
method and not stakeholder selection.
5 The CAMU working group was formed by Sandia National Labs to assist Sandia in the potential siting of a
facility to consolidate and store wastes generated from the clean up of hazardous wastes at Sandia.
i
* Environmental organizations
* Civic groups and neighborhood organizations
* Educational and religious organizations
* Minority Groups
* Health and safety professionals
The first set of interviews involved only Sandia, DOE and DOE contract representatives.
After the first set of interviews, based on a list of potential stakeholders compiled by DOE,
Sandia and potential participants, a set of refined questions were asked to 27 potential
participants. They identified themselves in as many categories as he or she designated
(Jennings, 1996) and no stakeholder who wanted to participate was denied access or
involvement. The stakeholders that remained involved in the process represented the
public, the site owner, and regulatory agencies (state and city). The six stakeholders who
completed the process through to deliberation, attended a series of working group meetings
extending over seven months, meeting approximately every other month. Table 2.2 lists the
initial participants, however, only six stakeholders remained with the project through the
deliberation phase.
Table 2.2: Representation of the initial stakeholders
The resulting stakeholders representing six organizations were asked to respond to the
questions and the activities of the process as a member of the organization which they
represent, rather than as individuals.
Governments
5 National Laboratories Employee
6 Community Advisory Board
Table 2.3: The Six Stakeholders who completed the process through to deliberation
2.4 The Decision
A decision involves identification of the objectives, attributes of those objectives, a method
of measuring the performance each alternative along each attribute (i.e. assessing the
consequence or impact of the alternative if chosen), a determination of the relative weights
or preferences amongst those attributes and a method for ranking the alternatives in order
to make a decision which adequately addresses the necessary trade-offs.
Figure 2.1: Overview of Analytic-
Deliberative Process
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2.5 The Alternatives
The alternatives in this decision are the options for remediation of the site. They are
referred to as remedial action alternatives, or RAAs. The remediation alternatives selected
for this project were narrowed down from a group of fifteen to a group of seven. The
selection of the remediation alternative is one element of the overall methodology
development. The seven RAAs chosen by the Team upon consultation with Sandia
National Labs and existing documentation on the CWL, all meet a minimum criterion of
addressing the action goals of the site, as defined by federal and state regulations. 6
Furthermore, they all must:
* Address the action goals of the site
* Be media specific
* Be contaminant specific and capable of addressing the contaminants in question
The RAAs are as follows(described in detail in Appendix 3):
B
C (excavation + on-site disposal)
D(excavation + off-site disposal)
E(excavation + off-site disposal)
F (No action)
In-si;U vitrnrcauon
in-situ stabilization
stabilization/solidification
stabilization/solidification
off-site
son vapor extracuon
in-situ bioremediation
thermal desorption
thermal desorption
off-site
Table 2.4: The Remedial Action Alternatives
It is noted that application of the resulting methodology would include a comprehensive
development and screening of alternatives, however, since this is a prototypical decision,
those RAAs that would not have survived initial screening on a technical basis were not
considered here. Each RAA was evaluated under two scenarios for which risk pathways
were identified. The exposure pathways were first identified by the analysts and shared
with the stakeholders. Any additional pathways of stakeholder concern were then
discussed whereby the relevant ones were also taken into account in the impact
assessment.
Each alternative was evaluated under two different scenarios defined by the Team:
Scenario ZI: the closest public receptor is fifty feet away, with residential/agricultural
development
Scenario Z2: the closest receptor is three miles away; federal control, and industrial
development (This scenario is used as the "No Action" alternative, RAA F)
2.6 The Objective Categories
In Section 2.5: Risk Assessment, the objective categories of the project were briefly
mentioned. In decision making, the objectives must be made explicit at the early stages of
the process. Once the problem or decision context has been identified by the relevant
stakeholders, the fundamental objectives are laid out. The higher level objectives, in this
project referred to as the Objective Categories, are typically broad based concerns. These
objective categories in the case of this project are:
* Environment
* Human Health and Safety
* Socioeconomics
* Cultural Resources
* Life Cycle Costs
* Programmatic Assumptions
These are common objectives when making environmental decisions, however the same
objectives are not relevant to every environmental decision situation. The stakeholders
and analysts arrived at these after a two day meeting. They are specific to the
stakeholders involved as well as the CWL site. Once the categories and their associated
objectives are decided, the remaining hierarchy of objectives is defined. For each objective
6 Primary sources of data include: Corrective Measures Study Plan for CWL, 2/1/95; CWL Final Closure Plan
and Post Closure Permit Application, 12/1992; CAMU Options Analysis, Final Report, 12/8/95; Environmental
Assessment of the Environmental Project at SNL/NM, 12/95.
category, attributes, or again in this case Performance Measures, are defined by the
stakeholders. Following that, the stakeholders designate the relevant attributes to be used
in the risk assessment(in this project we use the term: performance measures to refer to
the element of measure for the respective objective).
The diagram below indicates the overall objective. Although additional attributes were
identified, the performance measures shown are those that were considered in this project.
In a comprehensive evaluation, additional measures may have to be considered as well.
The prioritization of these objectives occurs with feedback from the stakeholders. Objective
hierarchy model:
Objective
Category
Objective
Performance Quan
Measure Tr
Quantit
Waste
Q•Waste Gene UrI
Waste Generated
SThe Objective HierarchyI
Figure 2.2: The Objective Hierarchy
In order to Integrate the stakeholder preferences with the risk assessments as shown in
figure 2.1, the decision process, and alternative selection for each stakeholder is first
evaluated in accordance to the following flow diagram.
Figure 2.3: The Decision Process for
a single stakeholder
2.7 Integration and Deliberation
In the next component of the project we integrate the risk assessments with the
stakeholders' preferences. First, we rank, using multi-attribute utility theory (MAU) ,
described in Chapter 4, the six RAAs for each stakeholder in accordance with their
individual utility functions and preference weights. Once the primary contributors for
each stakeholder is determined, sensitivity studies were done to test the stability of our
results. In integrating risk assessments (twenty realizations for each RAA, for each
Performance Measure) with the preference weights, and utilities for nineteen performance
measures from each stakeholder, for 6 stakeholders, leads to a complex process with many
possible sources of uncertainty.' We proceed to test the sensitivity of the weights, the
impact results and the utilities. From which, we determine those rankings which may not
be stable.
Given that there is no mathematical model which fully captures the complexity of
integrating risk assessment and stakeholder values, we draw on the ongoing elicitation of
these values and via risk management techniques, examine the key interests and major
contributors to the points of disagreement. This focus on the basic elements will - as we
will test - allow for a discussion which brings out the major tradeoffs in relation to both the
risks and values, necessary In selecting a remedial alternative.
Deliberation, being the cumulative integration of the ongoing deliberative meetings will
serve to integrate the technical analyses, the stakeholders values to determine an overall
ranking of the alternatives available which is supported by the stakeholders involved. The
key questions that must be addressed:
* Did the quantification of the stakeholders' preferences maintain the integrity of those
preferences?
* Are the assumptions understood?
* Are the uncertainties explicit?
Preparing the deliberation, we focus on understanding the major drivers of each
stakeholder's preferences. Furthermore, this analysis determines the characteristics of the
RAAs constitute the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. The formulation of
strategies for deliberation, aimed at resolution of disagreements and attainment of the
7 We assume the elicited information, that is, the weights and the ranges, correctly represent what the
individual thinks they represent.
deliberation goals is both a qualitative and quantitative process. Each stakeholder is
presented with a qualitative as well as quantitative assessment of his or her rankings and
primary contributors, as well as apparent reasons, drawn from an analysis of the
technologies themselves prior to the deliberation.
2.8 Final Product
Once the deliberation is completed, the product of that deliberation, as far as the
stakeholders are concerned is a recommendation to the Department of Energy concerning
the remediation of the Chemical Waste Landfill. Our goals for that deliberation keeping in
mind that this is a prototype case study and as such the "recommendation" is a
experimental recommendation, are to develop a process which has successfully integrated
risk assessments and stakeholder values while simultaneously satisfying the process and
substantive goals of a deliberation.
CHAPTER 3: ELEMENTS OF RISK
Imagination is more powerful than knowledge - Albert Einstein
Trust and risk are two interlinked elements underlying the environmental decision
making process. Agencies, scientists and the public involved in and affected by the
environmental decision making process have different perceptions of the risks.
These perceptions have limited the past decision making capabilities because of the
exclusion of certain parties due to a perceived need for time and financial efficiency
on the part of the agencies, or a technical arrogance on the part of scientists.
Excluding the affected parties from the decision making, contributes to a feeling of
mistrust, thereby perpetuating the controversy between agencies and the public.
This is related to a misunderstanding regarding the elements and importance of the
risks (Slovic, 1996). In order to attain sustainable long term decisions, agencies
must address these issues of risk and trust with the stakeholders. By broadening
the risk characterization process, the decision making process is enhanced both in
terms of process and substance. Involving the stakeholders not only contributes to a
more accurate definition of the problem but also builds trust in the agency so long
as the process in "sincere" and not simply following a set of guidelines without a
equal level of effort (Laws, 1996). This chapter discusses the need for improved risk
communication and assessment techniques from their root causes to potential
solutions. It concludes with a discussion of the interdependent relationship between
risk and decision making, illuminating the role of deliberation in this process.
3.1 A Definition of Risk
Risk: the mere mention of word evokes both feelings and images in individuals
which centered around fear, uncertainty, peril and insecurity. How individuals
categorize the risks differ depending on a variety of factors: psychological, physical,
personal. Most scientists, whether in the social, physical or biological sciences, have
come to realize that there are a variety of factors that contribute to an individual's
perception of risk, as such, one concrete and absolute definition is not
possible(Fischoff et al., 1995; Slovic, 1996; Fischoff et al., 1984). We present some
of the commonly accepted interpretations of risk. Kaplan and Garrick broadly define
risk as equal to the uncertainty plus the damage; it is the probability and
consequence (Kaplan and Garrick, 1983). Scientists readily use this definition and
accompanying formulae (Kumamoto,1996; Kaplan and Garrick, 1983), to help
determine the risks involved in systems, technology applications, such as
remediation technologies. The latest report from the Presidential/Congressional
Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management defines risk as the
combination of two factors: probability that an adverse event will occur and the
consequences of the event (1997). Others involved in the characterization of risk,
frequently define risk as the probability of a hazard occurring multiplied by the
impact of that hazard(Susskind and Field, 1996). There is an elementary difference
in these two approaches to the definition of risk. Societal definitions of risk and
mathematical definition do not convey the same message, thus if a risk manager is
to try and address the problem, the definition must first be clarified. There are also
differences in how scientists themselves define events and even assign probabilities
to the events; these biases, can be a function of education, political persuasion,
organizational objectives, or simply psychological differences.
Beyond the quantitative description of risk, the lay person views risk in a different
fashion, as a function of social status, gender, education, psychological make-up,
experience, and possibly numerous other factors (Slovic, Trust, Sex... 1996;
Jasanoff, 1993; Flynn and Slovic, 1994). These biases are frequently said to be
perceived risk, while the risk as analyzed by scientists is the "real" risk; yet just as
the scientist draws on her education to help her formulate and calculate the risk
associated with a given event, so does the public. The resulting divide in the
meaning of risk lies at the heart of the controversy that has arisen around the
formulation of environmental policies.
3.2 Risk Assessment
Risk assessments are performed to estimate the potential health, environmental
and economical consequences of an action, traditionally been thought to be free of
value judgments, as they attempt to establish scientific estimates of health and
environmental risks of a given action. Commonly performed by governmental
agencies ideally in efforts to identify the risks, the art and science of risk
assessment were developed as an objective tool for scientists and politicians needing
more facts (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) and has been promoted through the
agencies as a meaningful tool in policy making (Ruckelshaus, 1985; DOE, 1994).
However, it is often the case that these analyses come into question by the public, or
other 'experts,' the roots of these controversies are planted in subjective judgments,
political, social and industrial pressures, and the capabilities of science itself.
Risk assessment is not only used to evaluate environmental and health risks but
also in other risk laden areas, specifically in relation to systems operation. In the
nuclear industry, for example, the risk assessment examines the system using fault
and event tree analysis, to determine the basic events, probability of those events,
and associated consequences. This analysis feeds into decision analysis which
utilizes the assessment to establish a logical framework to guide the decision maker
in the selection of alternatives, whether it be the plant manager, or the regulatory
agency. In analyzing the risks, be it environmental, epidemiological or nuclear
reactor systems, the analyst is required to make judgments concerning the
importance of data or the structure of the fault tree, such as scenario development
and the quantification of public risks (Kumamoto, et al., 1996; Keeney, 1994,
Creating...; Apostolakis, 1990). These judgments, while based on experiments,
education and professional intuition, are nonetheless, judgments and along with the
analyses must be communicated to those responsible for "managing" the risks. This
transferring of data and knowledge from one body of individuals to another -
uninvolved in the assessment - is an additional communication pathway which can
result in a further misunderstanding or interpretation of the results, and yet, it is
these results that the managers depend on for managing the risks. Those
traditionally responsible for managing the risks may be simultaneously faced with
additional political, social or industrial pressures which do not allow their sole
attention to be focused on mitigating the risks presented by the analysts.
Biases
The biases and subjectivity of risk assessment are frequently raised in relation to
the discrepancy between the scientists, or 'experts' and the public. When
performing an assessment, it is necessary to make judgments concerning the model
used, and the approach to the assessment. Often, risk assessors have the task and
the responsibility of making assumptions concerning elements that are non-
quantifiable, concerning values related to ethics and culture. Technological choices
sometimes involve weighting the value of a river vista, small town style of living, a
holy place, or the survival of an endangered species, in addition to human health,
against probable benefits. Such matters are ultimately of values. (NRC, 1989:51),
and the subsequent assumptions are highly contestable when the consequences of
the decision affect the public.
Framing
Framing the risk situation is perhaps the most consequential aspects of risk
analysis as it is an exercise in power. "If you define risk one way, then one option
will rise to the top as the most cost effective, or the safest, or the best. If you define
it another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other
contextual factors, you will likely get a different ordering of your action solutions.
(Slovic, Trust... 1996)". Those in charge of the analysis determine the methods and
subject of the assessment, and therefore set the foundation for how the analyses
proceed. Pressures and judgments force the framing of the situation; if there is a
questionable assumption made from the initiating event of problem definition, the
stability of the entire structure is questionable. Framing the problem also involves
making assumptions, assumptions which can lead to omission of vital data.
Omitting data can result in stakeholders opposition of the decision to the extent
that its implementation is blocked and costs, social and financial ensue, as was the
case in Granite City, Illinois concerning the health and environmental decision
regarding the future of a lead smelter (U.S. EPA, 1997, Presidential Commission...).
Pressures
Risk Assessment, is not only vulnerable to the biases of framing and the inherent
uncertainties, but the direction of the assessment is also open to political and social
pressures which may push the direction of the assessment in a particular direction.
Granted the raw tools for the assessment, expected utility theory, probabilistic risk
assessment, may not be open to the political pressures however the utilization of
those tools - as employed by human beings - are (Apostolakis, 1990). Jasanoff
(1993) states that the search for objectivity in scientific assessment has kept the
risk assessment and risk management components separated. This separation is
based on the assumption that separating these two elements will eliminate the
political and social pressures and thus allow the assessment to be "correct" only
precipitates further problems(NRC, 1996). The political and social pressures do in
fact guide analyses and definitions of risk as demonstrated in the on going
assessment of the Yucca Mountain high level radioactive waste site in Nevada,
which is burdened by a myriad of political pressures(Hassel, 1995). Similarly,
opposing side in court cases have little difficulty locating scientists to draw contrary
conclusions from the same data (Harr, 1996; Susskind and Field, 1996). Money
continues to be spent on the risks that social pressures deem worth the expenditure,
while scientific assessments, demonstrate that other risks would be better served
(Slovic, 1994; Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996) Risk is not only relative to the
observer, as stated by Kaplan and Garrick(1983), but also relative to the situation
and the interactions between the participants and the backdrop.
Scientific Uncertainty
As our ability to measure the impact and affect of various does of certain chemicals,
our expectations of mitigating these risks increases, while uncertainty of the
assessment perseveres. There are numerous types of uncertainty that must be
addressed in environmental decision making (Morgan et al., 1990, 1992). In
modeling and assessing the risks involved in the given situation, scientist must
make assumptions and account for uncertainties, both in the models used and in the
parameters within those models. Furthermore, the concept of zero risk levels
continue to be supported through many legislative pressure groups, as well as the
desire for a certain assessment of the consequences grows, yet the capability of risk
assessment is devaluated if its disadvantages are ignored. Ozawa(1992), rather
than arguing about the uncertainties or assumptions in scientific analysis, supports
that criteria for acceptable scientific information be openly negotiated or discussed
prior to the decision making or conflict resolution. In order to adjust for the biases
in science which can compound difficult policy choices, she supports the utilization
of science to facilitate the decision making and conflict resolution.
Risk assessment is a tool to aid decision makers, it was created by scientists and as
with any human creation can be employed in a myriad of ways, thus the technology
of risk assessment cannot be, in and of itself, the foundation of democratic and
socially wise policies, yet it can be a critical compliment to regulatory decision
making.
3.3 Risk Management
Historically, risk management has followed from risk assessments. Once a risk is
identified, steps to mitigate that risk are taken although the steps taken to manage
an identified risk are not always proportionate to the scientific assessment of the
risk. In order to incorporate the risks into more sustainable decisions, policy
makers, industries etc. have turned to risk management, although it does not
necessarily decrease the risk as measured; it is the process of implementing
precautionary measures which minimize the overall risk of a situation.
Risk management actions can also take the form of reaction, rather than
precaution. As illustrated in the case of Alar, a chemical once used by apple
growers, the EPA announced in 1989 that in a 70-year period, 5 in 100,000 people
exposed to the chemical would get cancer. The agency subsequently announce that
it would not ban the chemical since there was not an imminent hazard according to
studies. However, once the media publicized additional reports as announced by the
Natural Resources Defense Council which stated that 5 in 20,000 children exposed
to Alar, ran the risk of getting cancer prior to their sixth birthday, Uniroyal
withdrew the product from the shelves. (Leiss and Chociolko, 1994).
33.31 Approaches to Risk Management
Techniques, such as those employed by industries in which there are significant
consequences, such as the nuclear power industry and the chemical industry,
provide a framework for making managerial decisions. In the context of regulatory
environmental decisions, risk management is the process of identifying, evaluating,
selecting and implementing methods/actions to reduce risk (Presidential
Commission on Risk Management, 1997). Management strategies proposed for
severe accident management strategies uses an influence diagram to map the
decision variables for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) blackout sequence, and
rank the strategies according to reduction of the probability of early contaminant
failure (Moosung et al., 1993). By defining the important criteria that must be
considered in performing the analysis, the analyst proceeds to determine the
associated probabilities of occurrence, including a best estimate that the strategy
will be successfully implemented by personnel.
Combining risk assessments with decision analysis in risk management to identify
the major accident or event scenarios through the use of event and fault tree
analysis, allows the decision maker to create and examine the options, as applied to
the following questions:
* What are the possible options for reducing risk?
* How effective and reasonable are these options in reducing risk?
* How desirable are these options?
These questions provide risk assessors with a general framework that begins to
integrate the assessment process with the management process from the start.
Some ideas for management strategies drawn from illustrate how a ranking of
strategies can be decomposed to determine the primary contributors to the risks
involved (Kazarians et al.,1985). By decomposing the risk scenarios to determine
strategies for minimizing risk is used increasingly in environmental restoration
problems (Wheeler, 1993). This structured problem technique of evaluation and
decomposition provides useful insight into the management and characterization of
the risks, alleviating the scientific pressures associated with minimizing risks.
Addressing these questions, the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, has
relied on cost-benefit analysis, and more recently risk-benefit analysis to determine
the optimal alternative for mitigating environmental problems (EPA, 1997; Climate
Change; Kerr, 1997). In the promulgation of environmental regulations, such as the
"as low as reasonably achievable" of ALARA criteria, which requires emissions
reductions based on a combination of risk analyses and costs assessments to the
industry in question. These methods and fundamental assumptions are defined and
determined by the agency on behalf of public and social welfare, yet employing risk
analysis techniques from a one sided perspective, the agency side have overlooked
community or industry values and subsequently proceeded with an erroneously
framed analyses.
3.3.2 Factors that influence Risk Management
As with risk assessment, risk management is not a purely objective practice; it is
influence by social and political pressures which are usually a function of the
perception of the risk. This is whether or not the pressures come from the public
who learn about a disastrous consequence through the media, or from industry
which feels the health risks from their actions are minimal, or from scientists who
perceive the consequences of a continued action to be detrimental (Sandman, 1987;
Kerr, 1997; NRDC vs EPA, 19 ). "The bulk of the EPA's budget in recent years has
gone to hazardous waste primarily because the public believes that the cleanup of
Superfund sites is the most serious environmental threat the country faces.
Hazards such as indoor air pollution are considered more serious health risks by
experts but are not perceived that way by the public (Leiss, 1994)" Political
pressures can also impact the management of risks (Slovic, Fischhoff and
Lichenstein, 1979; Ozawa, 1992). Political needs can influence the definition of the
problem; however, political goals, such as "zero risk" are not practical of technically
feasible.
J'lu shots
Asbestos controls
All toxin controls
Arsenic emissions controls
Radiation controls
$500
$1.9 million
$2.8 million
$6.0 million
$10.0 million
Source: Adapted from Slovic, P. Trust...(1996).
Table 3. 1: Annual Cost of Risk
In recent years, some managers have tried to attain zero risk yet this is not only
scientifically but socially incomprehensible. "An uncompromising insistence on a
no-risk society may contribute to tedious litigation and bureaucratic inertia and
many major hazards may go unregulated as a result. (Sagoff, p199,1996)." How,
with so many interpretations as to what is actually a risk, could Congress or any
other manager of risk, hope to attain a level of zero risk for all involved and
affected?
In an effort to improve the decisions of the regulatory agencies, risk management
and risk analysis must be integrated from the start. Given the uncertainties of the
parameters and models used in risk analysis, we can no longer rely on the
assumptions of one expert to define the problem, analysis method and scenarios
which formulate an analysis on which to base management decisions, for too often
the assumptions made neglect key objectives and preferences from those with a
vested interest or specialized knowledge of the situation at hand. Both components
provide indispensable information and thus cannot not be discounted, particularly
in the areas of both a technological and social nature, since technology and society
are forever intertwined, as they have been from the beginning and end of time.
3.4 Risk Communication and Perception
In an effort to integrate assessment and management of risk, communication and
perception issues must be addressed as well. Often, the public perceives that the
agency does not fairly distribute the risks, consequently, the decision is questioned
and trust in the agency's ability to make sound decisions diminished (Dillon,1996)
In dealing with inequities, neither normative, nor utility theory are sufficient, and
yet the technical issues can often be evaluated best using such analytical
techniques.
An individual's perception of the risk involved in a certain set of actions will
undoubtedly influence their feeling towards a certain action. This is illustrated in
the discrepancy that is seen when normative decision models are manipulated to try
to describe human behavior. To address the causes of misunderstanding or
differences in perception about risk, Leiss and Chociolko(1994) highlight three main
factors that have been shown to influence perceived risks:
1. The degree to which the hazard is understood
2. Degree to which it involves feelings of dread
3. Size and type of the population at risk
These factors can be defined differently and in the agencies' efforts to
"communicate" their definitions to the public, trust can be lost if the agency
patronizes or neglects the public. On the other hand, the public my perceive the
agency's actions as insincere, thus the result would also be a loss of trust. To
establish trust, is to establish a relationship and a relationship can only be
established over time. The best way to begin is with an open and flexible process
that promotes collaboration on solving the problems that affect the community. It
requires a commitment on the part of the participants to define the risks as relative
to the affected parties, while simultaneously taking into account the technical
evaluations and limitations.
3.4.1 Decisions : the individual and risk perception
In order to reach the goal of successful integration of the stakeholders and the
multiple dimensions of risk, the way in which an individual stakeholder makes
decisions under risk must be examined. In cases in which risks enter, the decision
maker (the stakeholder) is no longer relying on pure rational logic, but rather draws
on additional experience and information(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1990 ) which influences the fact that individuals construct different
understandings of the risks of a decision situation(Slovic et al, 1987, 1996). These
perceptions which are subtle, and often beyond the explanatory capacity of present
science lead the individual to make choices which may not in fact "maximize" the
analyzed utility of the options available(Dennett, 1981; Tversky and Kahneman,
1995). Moreover, even the perception of what is a maximization, differs. Many
from the field of risk analysis have also recognized the limits of a purely normative
approach (Slovic1995; Jasanoff, 1993; Fishburnl988). Jasanoff states:
How people interpret a given set of facts about risk may
depend on a host of variables, such as their institutional
affiliation, their trust in the information provider, their
prior experience with similar risk situations and their
power to influence the source of risk. Far from being
irrational, these private calculations generally
represent sophisticated attempts to translate risk
information down to meaningfully intimate scales of
personal experience (1993).
Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (1979) of human behavior attempts to
account for the decision making rationale under risk, describing the risk behavior of
individuals. In a given decision situation, the resulting choice of options will differ
amongst individuals depending on the individual's perspective of a situation, that
individual will be risk-seeking, risk-adverse, or risk neutral. (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, deNeufville, 1990). Such a distinction in perceptions of individuals
also exhibited in the difference between lay and expert perception of the risks
attributed to nuclear power (Slovic et al., 1980). Accordingly, the way in which the
situation is framed can significantly influence the individual's actions or choices. In
the following example, the affect that the framing of the problem has on an
individual's perception is demonstrated.
Treatment 10% 0% 90% i100%
After 1 year 32% 23% 68% 77%
After 5 years 66% 78% 34% 22%
Subjects choosing 44% i18%
radiation therapy
(McNeil et al. 1982 in NRC 1996)
Table 3. 2: Risk Perception: A question of framing
The above chart tabulates the results of a survey given to the public concerning
cancer treatment. The same question was asked, but it was first framed in terms of
mortality and second in terms of equivalent survival rates. The mode of questioning
had a significant impact on the individual interpretation and willingness to undergo
treatment. When the individual's were asked if they would undergo cancer
treatment and the risks were framed in the mortality context, they were more likely
to undergo treatment. However, when the risks were presented against the
background of survival after treatment, interviewees tended to decline treatment.
The underlying meaning of both questions is the same, in terms of technical
meaning and yet the public and experts alike had the same tendency in their
responses. The framing of the situation varies depending on the individual's point
of reference, a point which can be varied by the simple labeling of the outcomes, or
more deeply, based on the background and experiences of the individual.
Additionally, Kunreuther and Slovic(1996) has shown in a study of disaster
research that individuals do not make decisions simply in line with an expected
utility model of decision making under uncertainty. It indicated a difference
between expressed preference and the actual preference or cost the individual was
willing to incur.
Another example is the societal concern over nuclear and hazardous waste, which
concerns both inequities and risk. The concerns and opposition indicate that
adequate communication, or rather interactive learning are of high value and that
there is a basis for a clear explanation of the technical issues involved in such
decisions(Jasanoff 1993, Daniels, 1996; Keeney and Merkoffer, 1987). The dangers
or hazards that kill us or do the most harm, are often not the ones which we fear
most. The factors which contribute to risk perceptions have been studied :
Voluntariness
Familiarity
Process/Fairness
Framing (morality, ethics, aesthetics)
A voluntary risk is much more acceptable than a
coerced risk
Exotic, high tech facilities provoke more outrage than
familiar ones
Does the agency come across as trustworthy?
Are the risks equally distributed? These questions can
be at the heart of outrage and thus, opposition.
How can the value of nature be accounted for in
decision making? How do individual morals affect the
evaluation? "There is no such thing as objective risk." -
Slovic, P.
,.wo,&,.Lv W..zA,-,-.LV.V.u-LU A ..C --,- ut•,au-ault auClieLfnL, SUCh as Dnopai, tne space
Shuttle Challenger, makes risks easier to imagine and
thus considered more likely to occur.
Table 3.3: Factors that contribute to risk perceptions
(Sandman, 1987; Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996; Slovic et al., 1979 Rating...)
What underlies the perception of risk is the individual whether because of
education, chosen career path, the individual's inherent value structure or
environment. Deeper than these issues are those factors that make us individuals,
whether it be genetics, environment or upbringing, we all approach a situation with
some innate preconceived notions; the perception of risk can be a result of gender,
race or political persuasion (Flynn et al. , 1994). What contributes to the way in
which a person judges whether a risk is voluntary or involuntary, catastrophic or
agreeable? Studies are beginning to show that race and gender also influence these
perceptions (Flynn et al, 1994; Slovic, Trust, Emotion..., 1996). In light of these
findings an implementable solution that addresses these behavioural components is
needed; it must be able to also be efficient and flexible as time, issues and findings
change and progress.
In the context of decision analysis, many of these issues come down to the question
of framing the problem and evaluating the preferences of those involved. If those
about whom the decision is concern are not involved in the evaluation of their own
preferences, if they do not have control over the definition of or choice to accept
certain risks, how then can those preferences be accurately or adequately
determined? Thus, with respect to agency decision making, an inaccurate
representation of the individuals preferences concerning risk, leads to an unstable
decision, the resolution is built on an weak foundation and thus easily shaken.
3.4.2 Multiple Stakeholders
While an individual has difficulty deciding in the face of risk based on numerous
factors described above, the task of bring together stakeholders, each in their own
right an individual decision maker, is inherently more complex. How can these
stakeholders decide on the methods for handling risk? Often theoretical decision
making techniques in regards to the theoretical aspect of risk assessment hold up
under the case of a single decision maker (stakeholder), however in cases with
multiple stakeholders or experts, these techniques alone do not suffice(Apostolakis,
1990). New approaches to regulatory decisions in the Nuclear Regulatory Agency,
require the input of expert opinion, yet expert opinion differs, despite some claims
that given the same scientific data, experts should reach the same conclusions
(Susskind and Field, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1988). Stakeholders must come
to an agreement concern the assumptions, the treatment of the uncertainty, the
modeling techniques used, all of which require communication. While the
mathematical formulae used in addressing questions of risk and decision making
may suffice in certain instances, i.e., financial risk management, they cannot simply
be aggregated to yield an overall solution representative of multiple stakeholders
(Apostolakis, 1990; deNeufville, 1990; Keeney, 1992; Arrow, 1988). As stated by
Apostolakis, (1990), "two decision makers may be individually coherent and still be
unable to reach the same decision.... (thus), the quantification of preferences and
maximization of expected utilities are replaced by ad hoc decision making criteria."
An individual may choose differently in social decisions than in individual decisions,
furthermore the fact that there are others to consider influences the individual's
perception and choice (Arrow, 1995; Fischoff et al., 1995).
To overcome the mathematical difficulties in obtaining a formula which
satisfactorily represents the preferences of individuals in regards to social decision
making, deliberation techniques offer the forum for stakeholders to come together to
reach social decisions.
Techniques to communicate risk
Communicating the risks, once defined is another challenge. If the stakeholders
have been involved in the definition process and the integrity of the process has
been maintained, the elements of risk should be understood by the multiple parties.
Past risk communication has suffered because of the flow of information in only one
direction (NRC, 1989) from the agency to the public. Kaplan and Garrick(1981)
offer a quantitative framework for analyzing and defining risk, while Sandman
points out that the public does not necessarily characterize "risk" in the same
scientifically logical fashion (1987). There are other elements, such as emotions and
values that go into what an individual defines as risk. Moreover, risk can imply a
number of different meanings: financial risk, health risk, risk of failure, political
risk etc. When dealing with social and environmental decisions, an equilibrium
must be sought between the political, technical and public understandings and
concepts of risk. If society is going to redefine or "characterize" how we handle risk,
communication and perception between the participants, focused on the substance
of the risks and decisions is equally important. The National Research Council has
identified the following areas where risk communicators usually stumble:
* Lack of Credibility: It is almost impossible for effective risk communication to
take place when the public does not trust the agency.
* Confusing Language: The ability to convey technical, scientific assessments to
people who have different fields of expertise
* Access: If the public feels that it does not have access to information which has
influenced a decision, it will become skeptical and distrustful. This has the
potential for the public to misconstrue the risks involved in a certain situation.
Such was the case in Japan, when the operators of the fast breeder nuclear
reactor, Monju, tried to hide the details of the accident. This secrecy lead to a
great public outcry for openness and investigations. Furthermore it precipitated
stronger opposition to nuclear power development in Japan, as indicated by the
Maki Town referendum in which the public for the first time in Japan voted
against the construction of a nuclear power plant in the town.
Decisions such as these, whether in the US or in Japan, are not left up to a vote, but
rather made by experts or single decision makers who flail at their attempt to model
the social welfare. Decision makers have previously recognized the myriad of issues
in risk laden decision and have tried a number of risk communication techniques to
"educate' the public as to the real risks involved. Most often these have simply lead
to additional controversies and feelings of mistrust. The public doe s not want to be
educated; they want to be heard. However, communicating such issues as
remediation technologies and associated uncertainties to a group of stakeholders
with a range of backgrounds involves creativity. As each stakeholder has a
different, individual way of learning and receiving information, complete
communication of every aspect of the process may not be possible. Past studies
have shown that even with the use of graphs and visuals aids, different
stakeholders understand the information presented slightly differently.
The main issues in risk characterization result from framing of the problem,
communication of uncertainty, political, social pressures from varied interests
groups, yet how do we account for these issues in environmental decision making?
The main argument is that involving the affected stakeholders will result in a long,
costly, inefficient process.
3.5 An Integrated Approach to Risk
Depending on the definition of risk, the evaluation will lead to a different answer.
"To imply that no moral judgment is involved, implies that the major dangers are so
obvious that they hit the mind like a beam of light on the retina(Douglas and
Wildavsky, p31,1994)." To bridge the gaps between risk assessment and risk
management, science and society, risks and values, the limitations of science cannot
be ignored, nor can the pressures simply be pushed aside. The so-called "black
boxes" - both technical and political - must be opened and the decision making
process broadened.
Risk whether social or technical is subjective and contextual. Scientific definitions
of risk may tend to seem more objective, simply from a preconceived notion
throughout society that science itself is objective, when in actuality, science too has
a perspective. If social decisions which are both value and risk laden on all levels
(most of which are interconnected), these decisions and their corresponding
assumptions, objectives and tradeoffs must be made by all the affected parties. The
attempt to analysis risk and then communicate to the public does not achieve
anything, as defining the framework for defining the risks is an exercise in power
(Slovic, 1996) and to take this control out of the hands of those involved and affected
will only lead to controversies. Furthermore, as Jasanoff (1993), points out, there
must be an integration of both quantitative and qualitative risk characterization.
This view has recently been adopted as well by the NRC in their new description of
an integrated risk characterization process. It is interesting that society has
accepted that the experts who define risks are those in the science field, however, in
the case of social and technical risks, the prioritization of the issues must stem from
the integrated society in which we live, balancing and recognizing the inherent
subjective in judgments and complementing it with a structured yet flexible way to
"Even if the experts were much better judges of risk than lay people, giving experts
exclusive franchise on hazard management would involve substituting short term
efficiency for the long term need to create an informed citizenry.(Slovic et al, 1979)"
3.6 Chapter Summary
One of the basic premises in a democracy is that the people will be adequately
represented by those they have put into office. Additionally the decision making
system in a democracy is to be open to public comment and influence. As
technologies continue to impact the way in which we live, we continually encounter
an ever complex model as to how those decisions are to be made and what criteria
they are to be based on. There is "no right answer."
"Success in risk communication is not to be measured by whether the public chooses
the set of outcomes that minimizes risk as estimated by the experts. It is achieved
when those outcomes are knowingly chosen by a well informed public (Russell,
1987)." Addressing the multitude of issues means involving the stakeholders from
the start of the process and seeking a balance between the technical and social
concerns inherent in environmental decision making.
CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATION OF RISK ASSESSMENTS
"The history of science is rich in example of the fruitfulness of bringing two
sets of techniques, two sets of new ideas developed in separate contexts for
the pursuit of new truth, into touch with one another. ....Once again this
means the scientist may profit from learning about any other science."
Robert Oppenheimer
This chapter describes the method used to integrate the stakeholder preferences and
results of the risk assessments. The first section discusses integration of stakeholder
values and risk assessment. The next section discusses the need for a tool by which an
agency can actually successfully integrate the values and risk assessments, as such a
decision tool must be able to meet the fairness and efficiency requirements of democratic
decision making. The integration tool selected for this project, multi-attribute utility
analysis(MAUA), is described in the next section, including the challenges, drawbacks and
benefits of MAUA in multiple stakeholder environmental decision making. The integration
method is then explained briefly as it contributes to the deliberation process. Lastly, the
integration results and pre-deliberation analyses are presented.
4.0 Introduction
Decision analysis is a way to set regulatory priorities, such as cost/benefit analysis or risk-
benefit analysis. When the agency acts as a single decision maker, it alone attempts to set
the objectives, frame the problem and decide how to "maximize social welfare". In
environmental decision making, both in regards to the need to address risks, as well as in
regards to traditional decision theory, the initial framing of the problem must be correct
and substantiated throughout the process; otherwise, there will be a greater likelihood of
an incorrect assessment, perhaps based on the wrong assumptions, consequently opening
the door for opposition. This is also seen in the practice of traditional risk assessments.
Early incorporation of the stakeholders broadens the definition of the problem, elucidates
hidden objectives, and clarifies some of the misunderstandings that have previously limited
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the effectiveness of agency solutions. By attempting to incorporate multiple stakeholders
in the decision making process, the agency faces the challenge of integrating many single
decision makers into an overall priority setting decision situation. Thus begging the
questions of how then do individuals set their priorities? How is the agency to evaluate
these priorities and integrate them into its own decision making procedure? It is these
questions with which this project is concerned. To overcome the failings of normative
decision approaches, agencies must go a step beyond, combining behavioural decision
insights into a decision making process.
4.1 What is Integration?
Integration, combining both social and technical goals to achieve a just and efficient
outcome, is a formidable task. Through an on going deliberative process, the social input
to a technical task can help elucidate hidden objectives and build a stronger foundation for
a sustainable decision. In environmental decision making, selecting the optimal
alternative for remediation means choosing between various technologies which have
different consequences and impacts on the site.
As the decision must not only be fair to those stakeholders but also technically
efficient/wise, the technical issues and facts must as well be considered. As was mentioned
earlier, there are often be biases or framing discrepancies which lead to the consideration
of the "wrong" problem, and consequently, the solution does not withstand the questions
and probing from the opposition, or other parties. Integrating the stakeholders means
involving the affected or interested parties in the decision making process: jointly defining
the problem and assumptions, addressing concerns, and making the objectives and
methods explicit.
4.2 Selecting a decision tool
How to integrate stakeholder values and risk assessment is a question which DOE is
currently probing (DOE, 1997). The first and foremost requirement for successful
integration is participation of all relevant parties from the start of the decision making
process. Assuming that all stakeholders are involved, a tool for guiding the process is
needed. Diagram 4.1 describes the overall decision analysis framework into which the
stakeholders' values and concerns must be integrated. To accomplish this task first
requires issue, or problem, identification. If DOE were acting alone in this identification,
the issues identified would be necessarily less than the amount brought to light by
involving a multitude of perspectives and thus broadens the problem identification stage
early on and ideally minimizes the amount of opposition later in the process. Once the
main issues are identified, a method is needed to measure the performance of the
alternatives available or suggested for the remediation against these criteria. The method
must account for the risks and values as defined by the stakeholders, as a group - i.e. via
the consensual characterization of the group. To this end, an iterative process that is both
qualitative - in defining the objectives, measures and also verifying the results, and
Quantitative - in performing the so-defined assessments and impact analyses is required.
Figure 4.1: The Decision Process for a
single stakeholder
52
One method which has been successful in aiding agency decision making is multi-attribute
utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; deNeufville, 1990; Keeney, 1994). Multi-attribute
utility allows the translation of non-commensurate measures to one common unit: utility, a
measure of an individual's preferences for a given attribute, providing an analytical
framework which considers multiple objectives by assessing the individual's utility and
relative preference (weight) for each objective. Using equation 4.1, the single attribute
functions which measure the individual's utility for the alternative in regards to that
attribute (referred in this project as Performance Measure(PM)) are combined to determine
the stakeholder's multi-attribute utility (Preference Index (PI)) for each alternative. We
use MAUA as the primary integration methodology from which the deliberation strategies
are planned. The main components in a structured decision making can be combined with
new methods that focus on the sharing of ideas and viewpoints in order to achieve
consensus or mutual gains. The following description is presented as background
information so that the reader understands the multitude of elements considered in such a
complex decision making process; we do not explain the mathematical details of each
component that went into the construction of the utilities (See Zio, 1997).
A milestone in the development of MAUA is the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947), who have formulated a set of axioms leading to the existence of utilities with the
property that the expected utility is an appropriate measure for consistent decision
making. This normative approach assumes that the individual adheres to the two main
assumptions in MAUA (Keeney, 1973, 1981):
*Preference Independence
*Utility Independence
One of the benefits of MAUA is that it utilizes a cardinal scale rather than an ordinal scale
and thus allows the comparison between objectives which are not commonly measured on
an ordinal scale. Furthermore, the use of assumptions, does not intend to be prescriptive,
but rather descriptive; unlike purely normative theories, MAUA, intends to be descriptive,
making no ethical judgments of a decision maker's rational behavior (deNeufville, 1991).
In the evaluation between various alternatives, say (A1, A2, A3 ... An) under a set of
attributes (or performance measures) that commonly have different metrics, MAUA
transposes all metrics to the common metric of utility, although the shape of the function
may differ between attributes. By evaluating an individuals relative preference between
those performance measures, wn - the relative weight for each performance measure, and
constructing for each PM, a utility function (U(xn)) which specifies the way the individual
prefers the range of the measurement, assuming the three assumptions are met, the
Overall Utility (Preference Index) for each Alternative can be determined (deNeufville,
1990, Keeney, 1981, 1975). If the assumptions hold and the function is consistent with the
preference attitudes of the decision maker, the equation for determining an individual's
overall preference is expressed as:
Np3,
PI(x) = w, (x,i)
i=1
Equation 4.1
where wi , the priority weight of the i-th performance measure (attribute), gives an
indication of the relative importance of the i-th performance measure, ui is the single-
attribute utility function for performance measure i, xi is the associated consequence
variable, and NPM is the total number of performance measures.
Utility independence permits the decomposition of a complex problem into its components.
If the decision maker adequately decomposes the objective hierarchy, Figure 2.2, mutual
preferential independence is a reasonable assumption (Clemen, 1995). Preference
independence states that the individual's preference for a given attribute does not depend
on the level of another attribute. For example, in the environmental restoration decision at
hand, an individual's preference for a given objective, say, socio-economic impact, will
always remain the same no matter how the impacts in another performance measure, for
example, human health and safety vary. In a decision under certainty, mutual preference
independence is enough, however under uncertainty, a further condition must be satisfied,
that of utility independence. Utility independence is a slightly stronger requirement which
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independence is enough, however under uncertainty, a further condition must be satisfied,
that of utility independence. Utility independence is a slightly stronger requirement which
states that an attribute Y is considered utility independent of attribute X if preferences for
uncertain choices involving different levels of Y are independent of X. Again, in relation to
the decision situation, this means that for a given values of consequence of performance
measure, socio-economic impact, the stakeholder's preference for a different uncertain
measures of an alternative performance measure, human health and safety, do not change.
Utilizing this approach, the weights and single-attribute utility functions for each
stakeholder are determined , and the assumptions are verified by the analysts. To each
attribute and objective, a relative weight is then assessed through elicitation then using
Equation 4.1, the stakeholder's individual ranking of the alternatives is determined.8
4.3 Benefits of MAUA
Unlike cost benefit analysis which is frequently used in environmental policy decision
making(EPA, Sagoff, 1996; McAllister, 1982), multi-attribute utility analysis does not
convert non monetary objectives to dollars in order to draw a comparison.9 It allows a
decision model which accounts for the interaction between attributes. Often, questions of
complex preference interactions are raised concerning such interactions in the decision
model, yet evidence from behavioral decision theory indicates that modeling such
intricacies is rarely necessary (Clemen 1995), when used as a tool in decision making.
Multi-attribute Utility Analysis(MAUA) has been used in case to highlight or create
alternatives (Keeney: 1994,1996; Field, 1990). For example, in Sabah, East Malayasia, a
decision concerning the issuance of a drilling permit to explore coal brought together
multiple stakeholders to help define the objectives and criteria for deciding prior to the
analysis(Keeney, 1994). From the stakeholder defined objective hierarchy, the decision
makers focused their decision on the issues important to those affected.
8 Elicitation methods for stakeholder preferences vary; see Keeney and Raiffa, 1972; Keeney, 1992; Saaty, 1980;
deNeufville, 1991.
9 References for Cost Benefit Analysis:
It was also used to determine the relative values of major objectives considered in decision
making at British Columbia Hydro Project. The process consisted of: listing the objectives,
distinguishing between means-ends objectives and strategic objectives, identifying
attributes to measure the strategic objectives and assessing an overall objectives function;
it involved the key decision makers in the company from different departments - the
stakeholders - and resulted in a list of strategic decision opportunities for the future
(Keeney, 1994; Leiss et al., 1994).
In these and other such complex scenarios (deNeufville, 1990), MAUA has been used as a
tool for agencies and governments, where the ultimate decision has been that of one agency
or government. In another example, concerning the location of a repository for nuclear
waste, Merkhofer and Keeney (1987) employed MAUA to assess the site alternatives while
simultaneously incorporating non monetary values. From their study, they recommend the
following for use in future studies:
* A portfolio analysis to explicitly account for the value of diversity and
interdependencies among the uncertainties in estimated site impacts
* Use of technical panels to broaden the basis for scientific impact
* Invitation and involvement of stakeholders
Keeney and Merkhofer recognize the difficulties in assessing a multiple objective decision
situation in which the objectives are non commensurate as with the objectives in
environmental decisions.
Multiple Stakeholders
Addressing the issues of risk management involving more than one decision maker, Hong
and Apostolakis (1993) use utility theory in combination with influence diagrams (IDs) to
integrate the multiple objectives into the decision making process. This methodology
recognizes the different perceptions of each stakeholder and that each will act to maximize
their own benefit. An "optimal" decision is one which is acceptable to both stakeholders.
The influence diagram is the structure upon which each decision alternative is evaluated
using MAUA and produces a overall utility for each stakeholder for each combination of
decisions. The unique aspect of this work is the use of game theory to identify optimal
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decisions. One could then use the resulting bi-matrix to try to convince the stakeholders
that it would be to their best interests to cooperate. It is further noted that achieving the
"optimal" solution requires cooperation and trust by the stakeholders(Bell, 1995). This use
of influence diagrams can be used to accommodate multiple stakeholders as decision
makers to analyze potential conflict and resolution options between stakeholders in
environmental remediation decisions.
4.4 Challenges with MAUA
Despite its apparent benefits, MAUA does have its shortcomings, particularly when
decisions involve multiple stakeholders, for there remains no absolute method to
mathematically integrate the multiple values and preferences of multiple stakeholders, as
well as the questions that are raised by behavioural decision theorists concerning the
legitimacy of the normative foundations of expected utility as a decision tool (Bell et
al.,1988; Hershey et al., 1988). When decisions are risk and values laden, it has been
shown that individuals do not always adhere to normative principles (Simon, 1978; Einhorn
and Hogarth, 1990; Svenson, 1996). Some of the questions that are raised concern:
* elicitation of preferences
* ability to compare incomparable objectives
* structuring of values which are not normally viewed in a hierarchical fashion
* preference reversal
How can we guarantee that the preferences which were elicited are the correct
preferences? Did the stakeholders understand the questions? Were the analysts able to
communicate their needs to the stakeholders? How can preferences be elicited, if the
individual does not feel it is valid to express his/her preferences in such a fashion? Can we
then say that they have no preference? "If theoretical difficulties make a social welfare
function impossible, the analyst, in hopes of preserving neutrality then transforms
individual preference ordering into collective ordering of social states, which the analyst
may argue as maintaining neutrality. However, this neutrality is only that neutrality
amongst competing preferences and not amongst the competing perceptions of the role of
the policy regulation in a democratic society (Sagoff, 1988:43)."
4.4.1 Elicitation of Preferences
In a simple decision making situation involving one objective, say obtaining a greater
financial reward, the decision maker will have a varying preference for different amounts
of money. Depending on the individual, this preference may be linear, exponential or some
other functional form. When there is more than one objective, this preference is then
weighted between the objectives. As with risk, the framing, or perception of the situation
influences the preference that the decision maker expresses for a certain objective. The
individual in accordance to expected utility theory would commonly act to maximize his/her
utility however, this may change under risk.
4.4.2 Comparing Incomparable Objectives
Values and judgments are a part of human natural. We are not "super rational" beings in
the economic sense of the word. In the case of a single decision maker, that when policy
maker takes the responsibility for deciding for society, the policy maker burdens
him/herself with the assessment of society's preferences, such as in the case of risk
assessments where the assessor must make underlying judgments regarding the values
and ethics of the affected parties. Furthermore, the policy maker must then compare
objectives that a single individual may find incomparable. In keeping with the case of a
single decision maker, limitations of normative theory become evident, even in the case of
MAUA. If we apply subjective expected utility theory, a decision maker must decompose
her preferences and judgments about consequences; s/he must think about the choices and
tradeoffs in a confined space and not reverse her preferences. However, it has been shown
that often the individual, upon learning the possible consequences of an action will want to
"reverse" his/her preferences, thus changing the outcome of the MAUA ranking (Bell,
Raiffa and Tversky, 1988). Sociologists and cognitive scientists give more weight to the fact
that the individual's preferences may change upon the acquisition of knowledge and that
there are additional elements which factor into the individual's decision making process
(Simon, 1955; Svenson, 1996), as is often the case in environmental decisions.
These issues are particularly important in the environmental decisions because of the
numerous elements associated with the concept of risk, as explained in Chapter Three.
Risk influences the scientific, social and political judgments on the social level and in the
same sense, interact synergistically with the individual's perception and evaluation of the
situation.
4.5 Utilizing MAUA
To balance the drawbacks of MAUA, a behavioral component must be incorporated into the
decision situation involving multiple stakeholders(Arrow, 1951). Despite its limitations,
multi-attribute utility theory does provide a useful guideline to aid in the decision
process(Merkofer and Keeney, 1987; Keeney et.al, 1978; Merkofer, 1987). As no decision
tool can be complete without necessary qualitative and behavioral feedback of the parties
involved, we proceed with MAUA and a quantitative integration of the stakeholder values
in order to guide the deliberation process.
In sum the main steps for making a decision are
1. Define the objectives
2. Define the performance measures (or attributes) along which the performance of the
alternatives can be measures
3. Establish relative preference weights for each objective and performance measure
4. Construct a utility function for each performance measure
5. Plot the performance of each alternative along the utility
6. Determine the overall utility for the alternative in question
7. Decide amongst the alternatives, or create new alternatives.
The definition of objectives is often done in stages, starting with the higher level objectives
and then the corresponding attributes of the higher objectives are those which allow for the
measurement. One common way to define the decision problem is to construct an objective
hierarchy (Keeney, 1992; Keeney and Raiffa, 1987), which allows the distinction between
the higher objective and their corresponding attributes. The goal is to ensure that the
hierarchy of objectives reflects the concerns of the individual or group. Once the
stakeholders, as a group, agree on a objective hierarchy, or influence diagram, the process
of eliciting their relative weights, stakeholder by stakeholder begins.
4.5.1 Influence Diagrams
Influence diagrams are used to help determine how each objective contributes to the
overall objective. The basic concept behind the influence diagram is that directed graphs
can be used to determine the structure of a decision making problem and by outlining the
objectives, attributes and influencing factors, determine the respective probabilities and
compute the important quantities. The stakeholders defined the two influence diagrams
that were used throughout the analysis. In creating the diagrams, there were two groups of
stakeholders, those that felt that public health is an objective under environment, and
those that placed it under the Objective Category of Health and Safety, as shown in Figure
4.2a and4.2b. These two diagrams will form the basis for the development of conditional
influence diagrams to evaluate the impacts of the various Remedial Action Alternatives.
Influence diagrams were used in similar stakeholder involvement investigations by Hong
and Apostolakis(1993) to examine the outcomes of a hypothetical situations utilizing game
theory to evaluate options and determine the optimal choice, which showed that a
cooperative agreement between the stakeholders would result in the optimal solution. We
draw on this work, using IDs as a tool to aid deliberation.
4.5.2 Integration
Once the stakeholders decided upon the Objective Categories, the stakeholders were asked
questions in order to determine their relative preferences in order to determine w in
Equation 4.1. According to classical normative decision making theory, the way in which
an individual's relative preferences should not change or be dependent upon the
consequences of a given action, thus the stakeholders' completed the preference ranking
forms, prior to seeing the results of the risk analysis. Since preference reversal can occur
(Arrow, 1988), an additional component is needed beyond the quantitative evaluation.
Upon the elicitation of preferences, Table 4.1a and 4.1b, The construction of the utility
function for each stakeholder, per Equation 4.1, was done through an interactive meeting
where the stakeholders, with the aid of the analysts. Then the results of the risk
assessments for each alternative under each performance measure are combined to
determine the stakeholder's utility (or preference) for that alternative. Table 4.2 shows the
utility for each PM and then the overall performance index (PI) for each remedial action
alternative (RAA) for each stakeholder. Thus, in accordance with MAU theory, from the
expected utilities for each remediation action alternative, the RAAs are ranked for each
stakeholder(Keeney and Merkhofer, 1987; Field, 1991).
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0.618
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The ranking, of the alternatives, shown in Table 4.2: Stakeholder Rankings, highlights the
major tradeoffs between the alternatives in respect to the stakeholders. Table 4.3 details
the specific contributions to the Performance Index for Stakeholder 3, illustrating the
major contributors to that stakeholder's overall ranking and providing the basis for further
analysis from which deliberation strategies are drawn. The complete data for the six
stakeholders is found in Appendix 1. This framework helps the mediator to focus on the
interests of the stakeholders as they manifest themselves in the selected components of the
technologies. By pinpointing the components of the technologies that contribute to the
risks, as perceived by the stakeholders, alternatives may be created in the deliberation
process (Keeney, 1992).
EXPECTED PERFORMANCE INDEX
RAA 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
.0936
.2045
.2157
.1829
.2225
.2576
.0475
.1718
.1281
.1152
.1852
.2052
.1297
.1594
.1547
.1385
.1135
.1944
RANKINGS
RAA 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean
6
3
4
5
2
1
6
4
3
2
5
1
6
5
3
4
1
2
6
4
3
5
2
1
6
2
3
5
1
4
5
2
3
4
6
1
5.83
3.33
3.17
4.17
2.83
1.67
Table 4.2: Overall Rankings for all stakeholders
A
B
C
D
E
F
A
B
C
D
E
F
.0711
.1543
.1771
.1786
.1324
.1808
.0529
.1111
.1217
.1200
.1353
.1276
.0501
.0910
.0908
.0820
.1065
.0888
0.0742
0.1487
0.148
0.1362
0.1492
0.1757
The following table illustrates the overall results for one stakeholder. From these results,
we rank the RAAs and proceed with the major contributor analyses.
Transportec waste 1 1 1 0.0194 0 1 0.0031
Process waste 0 0.1479 0.1479 0.1479 1 1 0.0037
ER waste 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.0117
Implementation cost 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.0425
Completion cost 0 1 0.369 0.369 1 1 0.0085
Impact on local economy 0.8 0 0.45 0.55 1 0 0.0001
Changes in ambient conditions NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
Compared health impacts NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
CA&H resources NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
Contaminant concentration: 0.25 0.1 1 1 0.95 0 0.0322
TCE
Contaminant concentration: Cr 0.3978 0.1577 0.0985 0.7993 1 0 0.0056
Soil Quality NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
Long term public (Cancer) 0.25 0.1 1 1 0.95 0 0.0001
Hazard Index 1 1 0.6314 1 1 0 0.0016
Short term public (Cancer) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0036
Short term public (Accidents) NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
Worker individual health 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.0787
Fatalities NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0
Injuries 0.0657 0 0 0 0 1 0.0291
Ranking 6 4 3 2 5 1
Table 4.3: Stakeholder #3: Performance Measure and Overall Utilities as determined by
integration
From the above Table, we construct the following graph which provides a snapshot of the
contributors to the overall rankings for the stakeholder.
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Figure 4.3: Performance Index indicating Major Contributors
This graph indicates the contribution of each PM to the overall utility. From this, we can
see which performance measures are the prime contributors. Again recalling the goals of
agency decision making and the process goals of deliberation, we directed our analysis at
the causes of the disagreements and agreements between the stakeholders as well as the
extent of those difference as a method to help us guide the deliberation towards consensus.
4.6 Analysis of the Results of the Integration 3
Three types of analyses are performed on these rankings: uncertainty, sensitivity and
major contributor analysis, in order to help formulate strategies for deliberation. We focus
here on utilizing these studies in the major contributor analysis, to prepare for multi-
3 The sensitivity studies were done by Roberto Accorsi, Enrico Zio and Susan Pickett. Zio, E, 1997, Doctoral
Thesis, Nuclear Engineering Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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stakeholder deliberation, supporting them with the sensitivity studies to provide a logical
explanation of the technologies as they relate to the stakeholders.
4.6.1 Uncertainty Analysis
The uncertainty analysis was performed on the overall spread of the PI for each RAA. If
the uncertainty bands are large enough, there is a greater likelihood that the stakeholder
may easily reverse preferences and thus re-order the rankings, from the quantitative
standpoint. Again, there maybe hidden, or psychological factors which are impossible to
predict quantitatively. However the uncertainty analyses do provide insights into which
RAAs may need further investigation. Thus, we examine some of the causes of these
uncertainties so to better address the needs of the stakeholders. The results of the
uncertainty studies are shown in Table 4.3 for one stakeholder, complete results are in
Appendix 2.
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean PI 0.1808 0.1786 0.1771 0.1543 0.1324 0.0711
Standard 0.0149 0.0089 0.0138 0.0156 0.0085 0.0191
deviation
Lower 0.1659 0.1697 0.1633 0.1387 0.1239 0.052
Higher 0.1957 0.1875 0.1909 0.1699 0.1409 0.0902
4.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analyses investigate how sensitive the overall rankings are to small
changes in various components of the PI: both the weights and the utilities. Again, this
aspect of the study can only go so far in substantiating the overall ranking since it is based
in the elicitation of preferences from the stakeholders which have foundations in both
normative and behavioural theory, and may be reversed, for so-called "irrational" reasons,
beyond the analytical ordering of mathematics as we currently know it. In the sensitivity
analysis, we can hold certain performance measure weights constant, and then by varying
the PM we wish to examine over a given range, we determine the amount of variation that
would actually cause a change in the overall ranking. Samples of this analysis are found in
Appendix 2.
4.6.3 Major Contributor Analyses
The major contributor analysis focus on the individual stakeholders to determine which
performance measures most greatly influence the overall ranking. From which we
examine the elements of those PMs in each RAA, similar to the way in which game theory
was employed by Hong and Apostolakis (1993). This tells us which components of the RAA
are the major factors in the rankings, and thus provide insights into what alternative
actions can be taken. As the mediator, we can then present the root causes and help in the
consensus building process, either by presenting the reasons against certain aspects, or
illuminating options and openings for the creation of new alternatives.
The major contributor analysis looks at Table 4.2 and for each stakeholder breaks down
the PI into the major components that either add or detract from that overall utility. It
examines the overall picture for each, in order to determine which PMs make the
difference for each RAA, for each stakeholder. We also draw on the graphical
representation, Figure 4.3, to identify the primary contributors. From this we proceed with
an examination of the characteristics of each RAA that cause this utility, to provide a
logical and understandable communication and deliberation forum, as will be explained in
the next two chapters.
4.7 Chapter Summary
To integrate stakeholder values and risk assessments, a tool for integration must be
selected or created. Using MAUA, we integrate stakeholder preferences and risk
assessments, to compute an overall ranking of the alternatives for each stakeholder. From
this ranking we perform three types of analyses: sensitivity, uncertainty and major-
contributor in order to devise deliberation strategies aimed at both substance and process
goals. In the next chapter, we describe how these results are analyzed and the strategies
prepared for deliberation.

CHAPTER 5: DELIBERATION
So much of what we think, our acts our judgments of beauty and of right and
wrong, come to us from our fellow men that what would be left were we to
take all this away would be neither recognizable or human. Oppenheimer,
The Sciences and Man's Community
In order to bring together the risk assessments and stakeholder values, a quantitative
integration alone is not sufficient. The uncertainty and human values involve dictate that
a more comprehensive balance is needed which addresses the various perspectives and
technical issues which yields a socially and technically fair and efficient decision. A
consensual deliberation has the potential for successfully serving this dual purpose. To do
so it must not only adhere to a fair process but it must also be efficient, in terms of time,
and technological capability - it must result in a feasible decision.
This chapter discusses the rationale for and goals of a deliberation in the environmental
decision making process. It presents the dual nature of the goals and describes why they
are often at odds with each other, and elaborates on some of the more pertinent issues in a
multi-stakeholder deliberation that must address the varied interests and technical issues
inherent in such a process. Then, it presents an overview of the steps involved in preparing
a deliberation, from which we design a deliberation drawing on the integration results to
help achieve a fair and efficient process.
5.1 Rationale for Deliberation
Deliberation, as defined by the National Research Council is "any formal or informal
process for communication and collective consideration of issues. Participants in
deliberation discuss, ponder, exchange observations and views, reflect upon
information and judgments concerning matters of mutual interest and attempt to
persuade each other." (NRC, 1996:4). Deliberation which offers a forum for the
discussion of interests which move away from the polarization of the interested parties
73
towards a discussion of mutual interests is often referred to as a "mutual gains approach"
or consensus building (Susskind and Field, 1996; Fisher and Ury, 1981).
Deliberation in its many forms offers an open forum for the discuss of interests which
moves away from a discussion of the values or individual differences and more towards a
discussion of the mutual interests and alternative ways of satisfying those interests
(Susskind, 1987; Ury, 1981, Keeney, 1992 Creating Value). Deliberation techniques have
been employed in a number of agency and industry decision situations involving multiple
stakeholders and conflicting values (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Renn et al, 1993;
NRC, 1996; Crowfoot J. and Wondolleck , J., 1990). Similarly, acts of Congress, mandate
that the stakeholders be involved prior to the promulgation of certain regulations (APA,
CERCLA, EPCRA). Calling for the involvement of the interested and affected parties, the
stakeholders, offers a method through which the agency can build support for the decision
in the long run where consensus amongst the conflicting parties can be facilitated; if the
relevant stakeholders are involved from the start of the process, the chances of ensuring
that the framing of the situation is acceptable and understood by all is improved(NRC,
1994; 1996; Presidential Commission, 1997).
5.1.1 Defining Deliberation
A consensual deliberation offers the best opportunity to build consensus around each step
of the decision making process, ensuring that the stakeholder interests are met and the
risk assessments are appropriately framed and substantiated. In sorting through the
myriad of literature on deliberation and negotiation, it is a challenge to find one definition
of deliberation appropriate to all circumstances, as such, deliberation in this project is
defined as a face to face discussion of the interests of the stakeholders and technical issues
of the site as the manifest themselves in the alternatives of remediation in order to reach a
recommendation concerning the clean up. We are not concerned here with other concepts of
deliberation which are extended to imply litigation but rather deliberation as the
culmination on iterative meetings amongst the affected parties and the on-going risk
assessments which have parallel and flowed out of those meetings.
To this end, Glasbergen (1995) discusses the evolution of the management of
environmental disputes as an evolving process which is "no longer seen as an entirely
rational process, (but) rather a process of consultation and negotiation among public and
private actors representing different positions and interests." He proposes a new form of
decision making with respect to environmental conflict that incorporates both governments
and interests groups; building consensus through collaborative problem solving.
Such a dual process helps to account for the range of factors, psychological and emotional,
that constitute an individual's decision making mechanism (Svenson, 1996; Slovic, 1996;
Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1991; Arrow, 1951; deNeufville, 1991;
Apostolakis, 1990; McAllister, 1982; Stone, 1996).
Although science intensive disputes must not sacrifice technical integrity in order to reach
agreement amongst the participants; the agency should not presuppose that the
stakeholders are incapable of technical comprehension and thereby sacrifice the fairness or
legitimacy of the process. Previous agency decisions, such as the infamous case at Yucca
Mountain fail because of numerous pressures from interest groups, concerning social,
technical and political issues (Schaeder-Frechette, 1996). Perhaps if such a deliberative
process had been initiated regarding Yucca Mountain, and the process had been fair and
open to the affected parties from the start, there is a greater likelihood that the decision for
a permanent or temporary waste repository would not still be in its present controversial
evaluation state.'1
Consensual approaches permit a forum for interactive learning, risk communication, and
representation and have evolved on the premise that early involvement of the stakeholders
in the decision making process will minimize the problems and delays traditionally
experienced when the stakeholders have been neglected in the process (Ashford,
1991; 1997).
10 Additional examples of successes and failures are found in Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, NRC, 1996;
Presidential Commission, 1997
5.2 Goals of Deliberation: Fairness vs. Efficiency
Despite nominal differences, analytical-deliberative process and the consensus building
process aim to opens the "black boxes" of prior decision making policies of governmental
agencies (Susskind and Ozawa, 1989; Ozawa, 1991), bringing together the multiple parties
to discuss the pertinent issues in order to reach an implementable solution that addresses
the interests of the affected parties. Consensus building, negotiations, deliberations and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution techniques have evolved in hopes of achieving
a long term sustainable decision that does not result in delays, litigation, cost overruns and
the other detrimental factors that may be associated with opposition(Bercovitch, 1996).
Although legislation and mandates from congress as well as the agencies themselves call
for this early involvement of the stakeholders, there are challenges to balancing the
interests of the stakeholders and the technical necessities of the problem. The deliberation
must be fair and efficient; two concepts which are often thought to be at odds with one
another, however, they are also interdependent. Efficiency can influence fairness - for
example through a prioritization of the important concerns of the stakeholders, equal
opportunity for participation; And fairness can influence efficiency - a fair process may be
more efficient in the long run, as it is less likely to create opposition if the affected parties
are actually those responsible for the decision.
Similarly, fairness and efficiency coincide with wisdom. As they are inherently linked, a
fair process which offers the stakeholders an equal opportunity to participate in a
meaningful fashion will initiate communication and joint-problem solving practices, such
as those needed in addressing the multidimensionality of risk, so that the stakeholders not
only define the problem and assessment methods, but also work together to find a
solution(Slovic, 1996). Fairness, furthermore, implies that all of the stakeholders have
equal access to resources and technical data pertinent to the decision(Susskind and Field,
1996; Laws, 1996). Again, ensuring equal access to this data has been a stated problem of
risk assessment in the past (Jasanoff, 1993, Susskind and Field, 1996).
As the agency strives to be fair in the process, it must also be efficient. Environmental
decisions concern objectives that if not reached in a timely manner, can result in poor
implementation plans, excess costs to the public, increase hazards, and in the extreme
cases, undue deaths or injuries to both the ecological and human environment. Technical
efficiency is also a concern. The decision must be feasible - the technology must be
available, accessible, and financially possible(DOE, 1997, 1995). It must also adequately
address the immediate and long term risks of the problem, both elements that are often
perceived differently by the stakeholders. In this regard, early involvement of the
stakeholders can contribute to the correct definition of the risks and assessment methods
as well. The assistance of outside "experts" is often needed in such a decision process, in
order to provide the technical data and ensure feasibility of the methods and technologies.
This thus requires that the "experts" are able to convey the technical data and risk impacts
to the stakeholders, while simultaneously incorporating the stakeholders inputs into the
actual assessment methods used. Again, this is an iterative and on-going process, where
the stakeholders must work together to define the problem, while recognizing some to of
the technical limitations. This definition is then utilized by the analysts in the risk
assessments. Each component of the process, as they are interrelated must be improved in
order that the entire quality of the decision making process is elevated and sustainable;
simply focusing on one component in the abstract, will only yield a temporary or narrow
improvement.
Addressing the intersection of fairness, wisdom, and efficiency, the numerous perspectives
of the stakeholders can raise an infinite amount of questions: How do we decide which
technology is "best"? and "best" for whom? An environmentally wise decision can be
defined in countless ways. If we were to take the perspective of an environmentalist, we
may say that an environmentally wise decision is one which does not change any part of
the eco-system (Leopold, 1945); whereas, an economist may say that an environmentally
sound decision is one in which the financial benefits of development out weigh no action
and therefore development of a local park must proceed. If we were to enter the
environmental ethics debate here no solution would be reached, and as such define a wise
solution to be one in which the technical and social considerations are evaluated in a logical
fashion with the necessary framework to be flexible, and still provide sound support and
justification for the decisions made.
"A dispute resolution process open to continuous modification by the disputants is... the
approach most likely to be perceived as fair (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p21)." The
stakeholders themselves need to feel a part of the process. Susskind and Cruikshank
(1987) highlight some of the key questions that provide an indication of such a process:
1. Was the offer to participate genuine, and were all the stakeholders given a chance to be
involved?
2. Were the opportunities provided for systematic review and improvement of the decision
process in response to concerns of the stakeholders?
3. The process perceived as legitimate after it ended, as well as when it began? Did
anyone feel taken advantage of as a result of the negotiation?
4. Was a "good" precedent set?"
5. Were the participants responsible? Was there a sense of accountability established on
the part of all participants?
5.2.1 The Role of the Agency
With respect to agency decision making, the responsibility for the ultimate decision often
remains with the agency and thus requires the agency to organize the stakeholder
involvement and decision making process. Questions have been raised as to whether or not
the process is truly fair, if in fact the stakeholders involved are only deciding on what to
recommend to the DOE; the process will be fair so long as this responsibility and the
context of the decision is clarified with the stakeholders at the start of the process. If the
stakeholders operate off the wrong assumptions and feel that their work and problem
solving effort is to be the final decision, when in fact it is a recommendation, further
opposition and mistrust may follow.
The deliberation needs to focus on the issues and tradeoffs relevant to the decision;
disagreements over values have a tendency to consume multi-stakeholder decisions and yet
the decision to be made should not try to appease each stakeholders system of values, but
rather, by addressing the interests of the stakeholders, reach a settlement which is
acceptable to all the stakeholders.
By moving towards a consensual deliberation , the responsibility of understanding is not
solely on the shoulders of the public or agency; it becomes the responsibility of each
stakeholder to try to understand and communicate in an understandable fashion the
factors, alternatives, consequences of the decision as they perceive them. Deliberation is a
learning process which can be employed to explicate the constraints and communicate the
risks (Daniels, 1996). From which the product, is a resolution that sufficiently addresses
the interests and elements, and ideally commitments from the stakeholders to follow
through on the resolution - one which is efficient, fair, and wise.
These are the broader reaching goals into which are incorporated standards expressed by
both the Department of Energy and the National Research Council. Those requirement
being that the decision is technically feasible, economically feasible, environmentally
sound, health and safety conscious, attune to public concerns and values, fair and just.
5.3 Challenges in Multi-stakeholder Deliberation
In the quest for democratic decision making, a multiple stakeholder decision making
process, can be time consuming and open the door to otherwise hidden controversies. The
greater the number of stakeholders involved in the process, the longer it will take to select
and organize those parties. Furthermore, the more interpersonal conflicts that are likely
to erupt in the deliberation phase. Individual vested interests do not always coincide, even
though stakeholders may be able to agree upon a common set of objectives, it is unlikely
that they will immediately agree on a method through which to meet those objectives. By
opening the process, the agency must be able to contend with these issues, however it is
better that they are dealt with openly and upfront rather than after the decision to act or
not to act has been made.
Anytime a number of stakeholders come together in a negotiation process, conflicts and
disagreements are likely to arise. One of caution in utilizing negotiation in order to smooth
out the differences amongst the multiple stakeholders is that often the technical issues fall
to the wayside, or remain solely the responsibility of the "experts" and therefore such a
negotiation, while smoothing out the conflicts, does little in terms of improving the risk
assessment or securing a technically and economically feasible solution (Hyman, Bacow
and Wheeler, 1984). Furthermore, Crowfoot(1990) points to the need for appropriate
representation depending on the type of negotiation, for example, a scientist representative
from a stakeholding organization may not be comfortable with an entirely political
processes of negotiation. This example also substantiates the claim that in some
negotiations, vital technical issues can fall to the wayside.
Another criticism of negotiation is that it creates incentive for parties to portray the other's
interest as negatively as possible, consequently contributing to the conflict(Dimento, 1986).
Thus, there is a need to bring together these two seemingly conflicting approaches to
environmental decision making; there is a need to focus on both the substance of the
decision as well as the process through which resolution is reached.
When employing such decision aids as influence diagrams (Hong and Apostolakis, 1993),
Further issues include:
* Risk and perception: communication and definition of technical issues including: the
amount of information presented to the stakeholders, the timing of the introduction of
that information, the areas of risk characterization on which to elicit feedback and
input and, the defining of the risks.
* Alliances that form between the stakeholders. If the stakeholders are involved in an
ongoing process, often teaming between the stakeholders can result. While this may
appear beneficial in reaching an initial agreement, it can result in ill-feeling or
controversy in the long run if one of the stakeholders regrets the alliance that formed.
He or she may feel that the alliance caused a reversal, or transformation of the original
intended stance. It may also result in problems if the stakeholder is a representative of
a larger organization.
* Building Expectations (Ashford, 1997) When stakeholders are involved in an agency
decision process, it has been shown that their expectations may rise concerning the
degree to which their input will be utilized by the agency. Similarly, the stakeholders
must also realize their commitment. The agency has certain expectations on the
stakeholders which should be made clear to the stakeholders. The agency needs to be
clear as to how much responsibility it can yield to the stakeholder.
* Exclusion of relevant stakeholders. In the stakeholder selection process, it is difficult to
decide which stakeholders ought to participate, specially if the decision model is of the
Working Groupl 2 nature. When the agency opens the process to the stakeholders, it is
necessary to determine, how many stakeholders are to be involved, the method of that
involvement and the time frame within which a decision must be made.
* Time. As the stakeholder deliberation becomes more intense, the process could
continue indefinitely if strict guidelines are not defined upfront. Both the stakeholders
and the agency need to plan. While reaching consensus is the goal of the process, it
must be achieved in a time efficient fashion. Stakeholders will loose interest and forgo
their responsibility if the process drags on too long, and will continue to harbor
discontentment with the process.
* Access to resources. The involved parties all need equal access to the relevant
information. This raises questions concerning how much information about the site the
agency ought to provide to the stakeholders about the site in question, and how much
the stakeholders should be responsible for investigating the site on their own
accord(Susskind and Field, 1996).13
* Defining consensus. What is the form of the recommendation? What determines
consensus? These questions challenge both the stakeholders and the agency and should
be address early and explicitly (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987).
12 Working group is a representative group of stakeholders who represent the public.
13 In this project, some analysts took the view that the stakeholders should be responsible for investigating
various aspects of the site and that they should maintain their own running memory of the preceding
presentations.
When embarking on a deliberation, from the perspective of the agency which is trying to
bring together the multiple stakeholders, these issues, stakeholders relationships, building
expectations, stakeholder selection, time, stakeholders interests/accountability , access to
resources need to be addressed. Other issues include the analysis method used, the
perspective of the scientists, the underlying assumptions in the evaluations, the inherent
uncertainty in the parameters being evaluated as well as in the model and the
communication of this uncertainty.
5.4 Deliberation Design
5.4.1 Forms of Deliberation
Depending on the structure of the decision-making process, there are a range of alternative
forms of deliberation which the responsible agency may choose from to convene a
deliberation: alternative dispute resolution, consensus building techniques, working
groups or public meetings (Crowfoot, 1990;Gardner, 199 --,; Constantino, 1996). We look
specifically at a type of consensual deliberation. Typically, such deliberations may be either
assisted or unassisted. There may be times when a group of stakeholders decide amongst
themselves to come together to try to resolve a problem and feel that they can proceed
without the involvement of a third party; however, when the decision problem fall under
the umbrella of agency decision making, the process is most likely to be mediated by a
third party.
Unassisted negotiations occur when the disagreeing parties agree to come together for the
purpose of reaching an agreement. A negotiation in the strict sense of the term, is a process
by which the disputing parties come together to reach an agreement, without the aide of a
third party. In the narrow context of local environmental decisions, it would be difficult to
employ such a technique given the diversity of interests and range of stakeholders
involved. In an unassisted negotiation, the participants choose to be involved, and would
not be involved if they felt that they could do better without a negotiation. A successful
negotiation is contingent on this incentive. Negotiation researchers refer to this term as
BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) (Fisher et al: 1981). Each party, to
participate in the negotiation feels the outcome it can achieve will succeed its BATNA.
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This, as in all interactions, has much to do with the perceptions of the participants, which
is inter-linked with their risk profile, as discussed in Chapter 3. An individual who is risk
adverse may assess his/her personal BATNA to the lowest acceptable outcome, while an
individual who is risk seeking assess the maximum expected gains of a complete win
(Fisher, 1981; Susskind, 1987). Once the stakeholders have agreed to come to the table
they must then proceed to determine the negotiation methods, goals and groundrules.
Unassisted negotiations can in fact incorporate technical data into the process, yet when
the decision is that of an agency, it is unlikely that the stakeholders will come together to
make a unified recommendation to the DOE on a pressing issues; although, groups of
stakeholders may unite to prompt the agency to action.
Assisted negotiations similarly require the agreement of the parties to come together for
the purpose of reaching an agreement. Once this has been agreed upon, the next step is
the determination of the type of assistance to be employed. The literature draws
distinctions between the kinds of third party intervention, and even within these general
classifications, the definitions vary. The hypothesis we explore here is that deliberations
which involve multiple stakeholders and risk assessments require third party intervention
of a mediator who is familiar with the technical and social aspects of the problem, so that
he/she can guide the deliberation, ensuring that it meets both the fairness and efficiency
criteria. In regards to assisted negotiations, facilitation, mediation and non-binding
arbitration differ in the proportion of responsibility assigned to the intervenor (Susskind,
1987; Moore, 1986).
Facilitation is the simplest form of assisted negotiation. The role of the facilitator is
primarily to ensure that the agreed upon process is followed. The role of a facilitator is to
assist the parties from a neutral and detached position. The facilitator acts in many ways
as a moderator, time keeper and over all assistant to the parties involved. The facilitator
does not offer proposals or strategies but tries to keep the participants focused and
communicating. The facilitator is a person(s) who all parties agree on. "The facilitator is a
skilled manager and takes whatever procedural steps that are necessary to keep discussion
on a useful course (Susskind, 1987:p 157)."
Mediation
Some authors have equated mediation and facilitation, however, we feel it is necessary
here given the complexity of scientific/risk laden disputes to make the distinction between
the two. Mediation is "the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable,
impartial and neutral third party, who has no authoritative decision making power to
assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable
settlement.... the mediator works to reconcile competing interests of the parties(Moore:13,
1986)." Mediation has been employed in decision situations in the policy arena concerning
such issues as power plant siting, and dam construction. Mediation provides a framework
through which the technical complexities involved in environmental decisions can be
explained while simultaneously providing a mechanisms for integrating both the substance
and process goals of the decision situation. The role of the mediator in deliberation is more
interactive than that of a facilitator. Again, as in facilitation, the parties should agree on
the mediator; however depending on the circumstances of the deliberation, or structure of
the stakeholder involvement process, a direct selection process may not be possible,
especially in regards to the current policy making structure and willingness of the agency
to relinquish such control. The mediator helps to bring the interests of the parties and
possible options to the bargaining table. The mediator remains neutral and yet strategizes
and helps the parties understand what is tradable. The mediator guides the participants
through joint problem solving, substantiating arguments with available facts. The
mediator must therefore be well aware of the issues and interdependencies in the problem
at hand.
Non-binding Arbitration is a method which more closely resembles that of a judiciary
process, however is one that does not commit the participants to the outcome and is
therefore not in the realm of our concerns.
5.4.2 Deliberation Design
The deliberation in this project has goals of both a substantive and process-oriented
nature. Substantive, in that, a recommendation is to be made which addresses the needs
of remediation; i.e., an actual written agreement regarding the remediation will be
produced (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Process-oriented refers to the manner, fair
and efficient, in which the recommendation is achieved. We, the mediation team, want to
ensure both fairness and efficiency. We are acting as the mediation group and thus
present the design of strategies and deliberation framework from that perspective. Our
goal is to help the stakeholders reach a recommendation concerning the remediation of the
Chemical Waste Landfill 14, we therefore focus on developing strategies from the integration
of the previous three stakeholder meetings that will aid the mediator in guiding the
deliberation and focusing it on the interests of the stakeholders while also addressing the
issues discussed in Section 5.3. The preparation for this consensual deliberation began at
the very first meeting with the stakeholders when they provided their preferences and
constructed the influence diagrams. In designing the deliberation, we stress that we
anticipate the creation of alternatives and that we therefore prepare for a flexible discussion
which is not cemented to the quantitative results. We present here an overview of our
deliberation design and describe the strategies developed to help prioritize and focus the
discussion.
5.4.2.1 Overview of the deliberation
The consensual deliberation - the culmination of an on-going iterative process 15 - involves
three main steps: pre-deliberation, deliberation and post-deliberation. The pre-
deliberation phase is the preparation phase, where the mediation team prepares a
tentative agenda, a set of groundrules, and a description of roles and potential goals of the
process. Depending on the circumstance the detail of each of these varies, however in all
cases the final discussion and definitions are those of the stakeholders. The mediation
team defines these only as a starting point for the stakeholders and should take caution in
doing so to remain flexible when facilitating the discussion.
The next step in pre-deliberation is to propose/devise possible strategies to aid the
stakeholders in reaching a resolution. These strategies are drawn from the quantitative
14 The reader is reminded that this a prototype decision situation.
assessment, the integration equation 4.1, of the stakeholder interests and ranking of the
alternatives for each stakeholder. It is also to prepare any pre-deliberation material
necessary for the stakeholders so that they have adequate time to consult the mediator
beforehand in regards to their ranking. We stress the need to reassure the stakeholders
that the rankings are used only as a guideline for deliberation to determine the major
contributors and potential tradeoffs necessary for selecting/creating an alternative.
Once these strategies are devised and the pre-deliberation material distributed to the
stakeholders, the mediator must then consult with the analysts so that the analysts are
prepared for and aware of the potential questions that may arise in the deliberation.
The deliberation itself begins with a discussion of the roles, groundrules and goals. Before
preceding with the deliberation on the remediation technologies, the stakeholders reach a
consensus on these three elements. Upon agreement, the deliberation ensues regarding the
site in question.
5.4.2.2 Tentative Goals and groundrules of deliberation
To begin any type of deliberation the goals, groundrules and the roles of the participants
must be established and acknowledged by the parties involved. The draft groundrules and
goals were established based on stakeholder concerns and interviews, as well as theoretical
insights (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Ury and Fisher, 1981; Doyle, 1976; EnDispute,
Inc., 1996). In order to clarify the objectives, a set of process goals, as well as a set of
substance goals, were defined and presented for discussion. Since the deliberative process
had begun from the initial problem definition (i.e. the first meeting with the stakeholders
and the analysts), and since there is no single, adequate mathematical model for decision
making involving several stakeholders, which captures the complexity of the problem, or
provides an implementable solution, a interactive deliberation is required. It supports a
systematic traceable and defensible decision making method.
15 The deliberation is the culmination of 3 previous stakeholder meetings in which preference data concerning
the objectives were elicited.
The result of deliberation, what the stakeholders and agency expect to get out of the
process, should be clarified and succinctly stated (Stone, 1996). Both the process of the
deliberation and the final form of the written agreement ought to be established by the
stakeholders. In order to guide the deliberation, we prepared a set of questions
* Do we wish to have multiple levels of consensus?
* Should we recommend one alternative by voting?
* Should we recommend a combination of alternatives?
* Should recommend an alternative most acceptable to all stakeholders?
* Should we recommend against some RAAs?
In our effort to establish accountability of all participants, we hypothesized that interaction
and communication amongst the participants is an integral component of achieving this
accountability and that a preliminary, explicit discussion of the process goals should
accompany the setting of the agenda(Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Moore, 1986; Fisher
and Ury, 1987). The possible process goals that were presented to the stakeholders as
suggestions, are shown in the figure below.
The background from which these goals are arrived can be found in a number of readings
on legitimacy, democracy and consensus building (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987;
Susskind and Field, 1996; NRC, 1994; NRC, 1996).
Fairness: It is a process for and by the stakeholders;
perceived fairness depends upon participation.
Wisdom: A process which is time efficient including all
available evidence and technical results.
Stability and efficiency: A process whose outcome is
feasible and has been arrived at through exchanges
that benefit all parties to some extent and penalize
none.
5.4.2.3 Roles of Participants
Beyond the process and substance goals of the deliberation are the roles of the participants.
What are the guidelines for involvement and interaction between the participants? How is
accountability achieved? As discussed earlier, building responsibility and accountability of
al the participants is a difficult and intricate challenge. If a person does not feel part of the
decision, he/she is less likely to be accountable for that decision. In respect to elements of
risk characterization, familiarity and framing of the risk are improved by involving the
stakeholders (Sandman, 1987). Thus, defining and clarifying the roles with the
stakeholders, can help to ensure participation.
"A mediator or neutral convenor may be able to set up a process that translates these
concerns into practical terms and may help manage it in a way that makes the guarantees
effective and believable. (Laws, 66, 1996)" The role of the mediator should be defined and
acknowledged by the stakeholders, which will help to ensure trust, respect and
accountability - all factors essential in establishing a fair process (Ashford, 1991). As
Sandmand(1987) notes, the public is more comfortable and the process of communication
more successful when they have actually defined and created the process. This is echoed
by Laws(1996) in his discussion of fairness.
Although all the stakeholders had agreed to participate in the decision making process
from the start, it was not always possible to ensure attendance at every meeting over the
eight month process. How can we, as the mediators of the process, help to develop
incentives and a sense of commitment? Determining the exact practices that lead an
individual to accept responsibility for the decision has been explored by numerous
psychologists, however in regards to this project, we propose to clarify the roles, thus
making explicit the responsibilities of all those involved; the purpose is to develop a greater
sense of accountability and actual stake in the decision, which leads to a more sustainable
decision. In Getting to Yes, Fisher and Ury (1981) note that the substantive issues "need to
be disentangled from the relationship and process elements," highlighting the relationship
issues to be: balance of emotion and reason, ease of communication, degree of trust and
reliability, attitude of acceptance, relative emphasis on persuasion, and degree of mutual
understanding. These issues are identical to those raised in the communication and
88
characterization of risks (Slovic,1990,1996; Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996; Fischhoff, 1990;
Ahearne, 1987). This leads us to believe that the role and understanding of the role and
position of each participant, be it the agency or the local realtor, are important contributors
to the establishment of trust and respect: two elements proven to be characteristics of
successful decisions (Ashford, 1996).
In light of these issues, we proposed the following role definitions for discussion amongst
the stakeholders, at which time the stakeholders were able to amend, alter, or delete them
as they found necessary:
Role of the stakeholders
* Influence the decision maker's choice
* Communicate concerns, interests, and ideas
* Listen actively
Role of the Analysts
* Provide clarification on technical questions
* Provide technical data on the impacts of each RAA
Role of the Mediators
* Coordinate agenda
* Guide deliberation
* Promote understanding of all viewpoints
* Facilitate discussion
* Promote a fair, wise and efficient process
* Identify major reasons for agreement and disagreement
5.4.2.4 Role of the Responsible Agency
In this project, under DOE's current decision making model, the agency will not relinquish
its responsibility for the final decision and thus the stakeholders' input will not be
considered as the final action item, but rather as a recommendation to DOE. In regards to
DOE's position and increased reliance on multiple stakeholder participation in the decision
making process, DOE is more likely to give greater weight to a recommendation made
through a legitimate process in which the affected and interested stakeholders reach a
feasible and efficient recommendation. Therefore, the DOE, in future stakeholder
involvement practices, would be well-served to be explicit about its own responsibility and
constraints.
In stating that stakeholder involvement is necessary for successful decisions, it must be
prepared to define what is meant by stakeholders, involvement, and success, otherwise it
faces possible conflicts later on. The result of deliberation, what the stakeholders and
agency expect to get out of the process, should be clarified and succinctly stated (Stone,
1996). The stakeholders need to be aware of where they stand in the agency's decision
process.
5.4.3 Tentative Conclusions
Drawing on the risk integration, Table 4.2, we draw tentative conclusions beginning with
those areas most likely to achieve the greatest consensus. These conclusions aim at
drawing out the interests of the stakeholders as they relate to the RAAs and prioritizing
their importance so that a meaningful and effective discussion may ensue. Systematically,
we refer to the Table 5.2, using the following questions as a guideline:
* What are the possible options for reducing risk?
* How effective are these options?
* How desirable are these options?
These questions are derived from risk assessment and management techniques that aid in
the development of management strategies; strategies which parallel the types of flexibility
and management needed in a multiple stakeholder deliberation (Moosung et al., 1993).
To prepare the mediator to guide the discussion, propose alternatives, and read cues from
the participants(Moore, 1986; Riskin, 1990), we developed the proposals shown in Table
5.4.2 to present in the deliberation; in addition, we prepared alternative proposals and
substantiating documentation to be used depending on which way the discussion with the
stakeholders turned. A mediator must be able to guide an ad hoc process, as the directions
of human discussions can not be, and are not, planned.
5.4.3.1 Devising Conclusions
In devising the potential options to be used through the deliberation as proposals the
stakeholders may decide to recommend to DOE, we begin with those proposals which
seemed to have the broadest level of consensus amongst the stakeholders. Looking at both
positive and negative proposals, i.e. in favor of or disapproval of an RAA, we hypothesized
that by beginning the deliberation with the points of agreement amongst the stakeholders,
followed by a substantive explanation of the causes, that we could not only contribute to
the development of mutual cooperation, but also achieve greater consensus; thereby
keeping the group moving towards a point of agreement without becoming entangled in a
needless net of destructive arguments (Doyle, 1976).
In order to draw tentative conclusions, we proceed to analyze the components of the
rankings, examining why each stakeholder ranked the RAAs as he or she does. To this
end, we examined the Major Contributor Analyses, as described in Chapter 4, for each
stakeholder, which provides us with substantial information concerning the most
important contributors to each stakeholder ranking. Comparing the utility across the
RAAs for a given stakeholder, an initial list of tradeoffs is made and then substantiated
with a corresponding sensitivity analysis, the results of which are found in Appendix 2.
These analyses provided the necessary support to be used in deliberation so that the
discussion, while flexible, could maintain a focus on the key issues of stakeholder concern.
1. A is the least preferred
alternative
2. C is neither strongly disliked
nor liked by stakeholders
3. D is less preferred than C by
all except possibly one SH
4. F is a candidate to be the
"preferred" alternative
5. E is a candidate to be
recommended
6. F and E are the two
preferred options
* Both worker and short-term
public health risks are high due
to airborne Cr particulates
released
* All stakeholders put a strong
value on worker health risks
* Highest completion costs
* Five stakeholders rank it #6; one
stakeholder ranks it as #5
* Smaller worker risks
* Some impact on local economy
* Less transported wastes
* Removes some of the
contaminant
* All stakeholders put a high
weight on worker health risk
* Off-site treatment
* More transported wastes
* More worker health risks
* Avoids risks to workers
* WHR is weighted strongly by all
SH
* Low cost
* Removes all of the contaminant
* Low long term public cancer risk
* Impact on the local economy
Reasons for E
* Long term public
* Impact on local economy
* Removal of contaminant
Reasons for F
* Worker injuries and fatalities
* Costs
* Wastes generated
* Preferred by most stakeholders
High completion costs vs. B
C results in greater short term public
cancer risk
C results in a lower impact on local
economy
* Leaves the contaminant in the
ground
* greater long term public health risk
* No cost and therefore no impact on
local economy
* High Worker Health Risks
* Requires a lot of workers
* Large amounts of transported wastes
* High implementation costs
Reasons against E
* Worker injuries and fatalities
* Implementation costs
* Wastes generated
* Lowest ranked for one stakeholder
Reasons against F
* Long term public
* Impact on local economy
* Removal of contaminant
Table 5.4.2: Tentative Conclusions for Deliberation
The first proposal stems from the apparent fact that all the stakeholders feel least
preference for RAA A. This observation may prove useful, if we can determine what the
causes are that lead them to dislike RAA A; the values of the stakeholders may differ yet
the underlying characteristics of the technology may cause a similar manifestation of these
values in the overall ranking of the technology. The technology employed in this RAA leads
to the highest risk to worker health of all the alternatives which have been evaluated. An
analysis of the performance measures driving this preference indicates that risk of worker
fatalities and implementation costs are of primary concern for most stakeholders. In
particular, all stakeholders place a large weight on the objective category of worker health
risk, and in this regard, technology A has the worst performance. From this analysis, the
proposal is thought to be one in which a consensus could be reached.
Advancing from the most agreed upon proposal, proposal 2 has both pros and cons in
relation to its acceptance by the stakeholders. RAA C is ranked average by all
stakeholders. Although there are lower worker health risks and less transported wastes, if
it were to be implemented the tradeoff made would result in greater short term public
cancer risk and a lower impact on the local economy. The greater short term cancer risks
are a result of the release of TCE during the thermal desorption process as well as the
vapor release of Cr and TCE during excavation and handling.16
The third proposal, D is less preferred than C by all except possibly one stakeholder,
introduces the discussion of uncertainty. This proposal is directly from the integrated
ranking and does not try to presuppose or group the stakeholders, therefore necessitating
the discussion of uncertainty. The primary drivers which indicate that D is less preferred
than C are that the stakeholders put a high weight on WHR, which is adversely affected by
the excavation involved in the technology of alternative D, and the fact that D has larger
amounts of transported wastes since the stabilized media containing Cr will be shipped off-
site. As indicated by the influence diagrams, this transportation also impacts costs and
worker health and safety.
The fourth proposal, F is a candidate to be the "preferred" alternative, is a stretch to see if
the stakeholders may agree on one alternative which they all seem to prefer highly, yet two
of the stakeholders do not rank it first. Furthermore, it is the "no action" alternative,
which for the sole fact that nothing will be done, may raise some controversy for reasons
that are hidden to any qualitative or quantitative preliminary discussions. Additionally,
one stakeholder's strong aversion towards long term public cancer risk caused RAA F to be
ranked fifth. As mediators of the deliberation, we remained conscious of this and therefore
did not expect complete agreement on this proposal, but rather opted to present it as a
starting point of a discussion that may serve to draw out a more in depth discussion of the
tradeoffs involved and the alternatives that could perhaps be generated.
The last two alternatives serve as supplementary proposals to be used if deemed
appropriate by the mediator. We do not wish to constrain the deliberation by holding fast
to the presentation of all our analyses. Two stakeholders seem to prefer alternative E.
One of these has a second preference for the "no action" alternative, F; the other ranks B as
second. The main reasons for these stakeholders to support option E seem to be the low
completion cost, the high efficiency of contaminant removal and the low risk of long term
cancer.
5.4.3.2 Stakeholder Specific Conclusions
From the analysis, we derived reasons for each stakeholders' ranking, they are
summarized in Table 5.4.3 and the results of the sensitivity studies are presented in
Appendix 2. These analyses substantiate the conclusions shown in Table 5.4.2 and provide
reasons for the stakeholder specific tradeoffs in order to steer the deliberation towards a
recommendation, providing logical reasons founded in the values and technological
alternatives available to aid the deliberation.
RAA F is preferred
* No short term- public accident
* Strong concern for public health
RAA E performs worse than RAA F
* E has more transported wastes
* lower performance on implementation costs,
due to the number of workers and trucks involved
* E is better than F in removal of contaminant yet
poor performance in short term health due to
transportation of waste
RAA B is similar to E in preference
* B is on-site and thus lower costs and less
transported waste
* B has higher long term public risk of cancer
RAA C and D are less preferred
d higher completion cost due to technology (thermal
desorption) and the cost of the disposal of the
treatment of the residuals.
D transports wastes off-site which leads to
higher costs
* RAA A is least preferred
* Poor performance under worker and public
health risks
* High completion cost.
RAA F is slightly preferred over the other RAAs
* No worker injuries unlike the other RAAs yet leaves
the contaminant in the ground
* Transportation of waste is the performance measure
which adversely affects the other RAAs in comparison
to F
RAA C and RAA D perform closely with RAA F
* The tradeoff here is that they remove the contaminant
which counteracts their poor performance in regards
to worker health
RAA B is average
* B performs worse than C and D in contaminant
removal since the contaminant remains on site
* B has a lower Completion Cost than C and D
RAA E is less preferred
* High Implementation Cost
* Significant ER and Transported Waste compared to
C and D
* Higher volume of transported waste, therefore E is
more costly
RAA A gives substantially lower performance
* In-situ Vitrification which yields high worker health
risks
Uncertainty analyses on the performance output of the
RAAs show that these preferences are rather stable and
that F, D and C are not markedly different.
RAA E is preferred
* Low completion cost and substantial impact on the
local economy
* Lower long termn cancer risk as compared to the next
ranked RAA F
RAA F performs nearly as well as E
* No impact on the local econonmy
* High risk of long term cancer
* Performs better than E in terms of waste
transported, intplementation costs, and worker
health risks
RAA C and RAA D are less preferred than E and F
* Higher completion cost
* E performs significantly better in process waste
generated
* D does perform better in the area of ER and
transported wastes
RAA B is slightly less preferred than D and C
* Lower costs and thus lower impact on local economy
* Performs well in terms of worker injury risk yet has
a high long term public cancer risk
RAA A is less preferred
* In-situ Vitrification which yields high worker health
risks
The uncertainty analyses show that these rankings are
rather stable.
Table 5.4.3a: Stakeholder Specific Conclusions
ni-I r is preierrea
* Does not generate any waste
* Cost-free
* Does not employ workers, thus no worker health risks
RAA B and RAA C are less preferred than F
* Produce more process waste than F
* Perform better than F concerning groundwater contamination
* Have significant worker health risks
RAA D is less preferred than B and C
* Treatment of residuals occurs off-site, thus greater transportation
activity
* Poor performance in worker health risks and transported waste
RAA A is slightly less preferred than RAA B
* In-situ Vitrification which yields high worker health risks
* RAA E is least preferred
* Large amounts of transported and ER waste
* Higher worker health risks (Transportation has a worker health
risk two times higher than that of other RAAs)
Uncertainty analyses on the performance outputs of the RAAs have
shown that these preferences are stable and that B and C do not
present marked differences in their ranking best.
anlgnt preterence tor i•AA h
* Low completion costs
* Over site treatment of contaminant
therefore lower long term public health
risks
RAA B, C, and F are slightly less
preferred than E
* Pose significant long term cancer risk as
compared to E
* Perform better than E in waste
managentent and implementation costs
* C is more expensive than F and E yet
has a better performance index in long
term public cancer risk
is ranked fourth
Greater transported waste
RAA A is inferior to the other RAAs
Greater long terim public cancer risk
High completion cost
Greater worker health risk
KAA ' is preferred
* Does not employ workers, no worker health risk
* Does not generate waste
* Leaves contaminant in the ground
RAA C and RAA E are less preferred than RAAF
* B and C have substantial reduction in groundwater
contaminant risks
* RAA Fperforms better in Worker health risk
* C has higher completion costs
* E transports more wastes off-site
RAA B is slightly less preferred than C & E
* Yields a higher amnount of contaminant in the
groundwater
RAA D is less preferred than B
* Transports more waste off site
* RAA D has a higher completion cost
RAA A is inferior to other RAAs
* High completion cost
* High worker health risk
Uncertainty analyses on performance output indicates
that the rankings of RAA B, C, and F are not
significantly different. RAA F and B indicate a lower
uncertainty & perhaps less likely to fluctuate in the
deliberation. E and A appear stable (quantitatively).|
Table 5.4.3b: Stakeholder Specific Conclusions
5.4.4 Pre- deliberation material
We present these results, in written and graphical form to the stakeholders prior to
the deliberation. Despite much research on the communication of technical data to
the public, there remains no concrete method for ensuring that all stakeholders
understand the data presented [Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996; Morgan et al., 1992;
Dillon, 1995; Johnson et. Al, 1995]. To best achieve understanding of the data and
process, the deliberation allows questions and iterative learning to develop. The
graphs and explanations provided are found in the Appendix 2. All stakeholders
cannot be expected to fully understand every aspect of the uncertainty analysis,
however we maintain that it is vital to the development of trust that they have the
opportunity to question and receive all information and analysis results. By making
the data available to the stakeholders prior to the deliberation, the stakeholders
had the opportunity to read through and cross check the analysis with information
they previously received. In this sense, time was available for them to formulate
questions and ideas, prior to the group meeting. Similarly, it also prepared the
analysts for the deliberation.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In order to achieve fairness and efficiency in a deliberation which aims to integratee
multiple stakeholders and risk assessments the key challenges must be addressed.
This is accomplished by both a quantitative and qualitative assessments, as well as
explicit explanation, definition, and acknowledgment by and amongst the
stakeholders of the roles, goals, and groundrules inherent in such a deliberation. It
is aided by a mediator, familiar with the participants and issues in the decision,
who is able to guide a meaningful discussion, promoting fairness and efficiency in
order to reach a recommendation that is technologically feasible and efficient. To
this end, we propose the use of integration (Chapter 4) to develop strategies to
illuminate tradeoffs, assess the important impacts of the technologies, and promote
creative resolutions amongst the stakeholders. The next chapter details the
conduct and results of deliberation.

CHAPTER 6: DELIBERATION CONDUCT AND RESULTS
"Men and women have the goals and purposes that are meaningful to them
because a biological structure in their needs and satisfactions underlie either
directly, or indirectly, their creation of meaning." Irving Singer, The Creation
of Value
Upon completion of the pre-deliberation analysis and preparation, the stakeholders and
analysts begin the deliberation. The main goal of deliberation is to reach an agreement
amongst the stakeholder concerning the remediation of the site. The analysts are to
provide support for the technical questions that arise, and for the process in general. The
decision of the recommendation is that of the stakeholders involved.
As Chapter five defines some of the major issues and priorities of a multi-stakeholder
deliberation, briefly discussing the associated problems that can arise, chapter six is
devoted to the pre-deliberation results; that is, the stakeholders discussion of the goals,
groundrules and participant roles.
Section 6.2 deals with the conduct and the results of the deliberation. It reviews the
actual discussion that ensued, and the responses of the stakeholders to the integration. It
also highlights some of the key moments in the deliberation, and the stakeholders'
discussion.
Section 6.4 deals with the deliberation goals and how they were met through the
deliberation, elaborating of the substance and process related goals of deliberation. Then in
Section 6.5, we expand on the analysis of the risk communication aspect of the
deliberation, the various tools of communication that were used in this project and the
lessons we can draw from the deliberation. In Section 6.6, we assess the interactions
between the various participants and provide some possible reasons and insights into the
relationships that evolve during a deliberation. Relationships and interactions have an
interest impact on the decision making process, and should be recognized for their
influence. Lastly, Section 6.7 discusses the general conclusions which can be made in
respect to the integration and deliberation as they pertain to multi-stakeholder decision
making.
6.1 Introduction into deliberation
The deliberation begins with the presentation of the integration results. By presenting the
results before the meeting of the group, the individual has the opportunity to formulate
questions and review the information in a timely and efficient fashion. Granted, we cannot
guarantee that all stakeholders will diligently review the material presented, however, by
providing the details, we can guarantee the opportunity to question and the time to
carefully think out the information and concerns. The main issues in a multi-stakeholder
deliberation revolve around communicating technical data, mitigating on the
disagreements that arise, maintaining a fair and efficient process, supporting a meaningful
discussion, and addressing the multitude of views, while dealing with hidden objectives
that may not be explicit.
6.2 Pre-deliberation results
The deliberative process began six months before this working meeting, when the
stakeholders and the analysts discussed the general approach to the development of the
overall decision methodology, as well as the underlying assumptions. In order to bring the
process full circle, the mediator presented a summation of the methodology used up until
the point of consensual deliberation. The stakeholders seemed to understand the
presentation and raised relatively few questions.
The first hour of the deliberation focused on reviewing the groundrules, the goals of the
deliberation and the roles of the participants. The mediator reviewed the integration
process with the stakeholders, allowing for a question and answer period. This served to
bring the stakeholders to a point of group understand and comfort, while simultaneously
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warming up the deliberation with issues that have been touched on previously. Once all
the stakeholders were satisfied with their understanding of the integration, we proceeded
to a discussion of the fundamentals of deliberation: the goals, the groundrules and the roles
of the participants. As these reasons were similar to those discussed in the initial project
definition, there was minimal discussion amongst the group. The stakeholders seemed
comfortable and familiar with the reasons for deliberation.
6.2.2 Goals and Recommendation Discussion
The mediator presented the possible goals, concerning what the recommendation should
look like and what type of consensus is needed for an action to be included in the
recommendation. The product component of deliberation in regards to this project was
preliminarily presented to the stakeholders by the Team, as follows:
Goals of the deliberation: Identify the major agreements and
disagreements concerning the selection of RAAs
Form of recommendation: What exactly should the group include in its
recommendation to DOE ?
These two components must be addressed before the potential resolutions can be discussed;
they address the issue of consensus and what it means for this group of stakeholders. The
stakeholders felt strongly that the mediator should not define the form of the
recommendation to DOE. They may not have agreed on what that form ought to be yet
they clearly agreed that it should be their decision with respect to the goals of the
deliberation. One stakeholder in particular expressed concern as to the extent that the
stakeholder input would be utilized by the agency. Concerning the substance of the
recommendation, the stakeholders did not reach a predetermined conclusion as to what it
should include, for instance, the stakeholders did not state at this point that the
recommendation should include a singularly agreed upon alternative, but rather that the
substance of the recommendation should be such that all stakeholders are satisfied with it.
It is not something which can be agreed upon before the discussion. They agreed on the
general structure of the recommendation and a flexible method by which to reach a
recommendation which all the stakeholders upon which all can agree.
As the discussion followed, the stakeholders themselves to be creative and collaborative
with the information and data presented. The stakeholders were against voting and
drawing absolute lines between any of the alternatives, agreeing that "voting" had a major
weakness in that it may result in the alienation of some of the stakeholders, and in effect
perpetuating the conflicts. One stakeholder offered that the recommendation prioritize the
RAAs on which the stakeholders agree. The final agreement on the form of
recommendation was that the level of agreement of each point submitted to DOE should be
explicit and the stakeholders ought to reach agreement without voting. The fact that no
hard and fast rule or definition as to what to recommend was sought permitted a flexibility
amongst the group to respond to the facts as they were presented.
The stakeholders felt comfortable with the goals specified. In the initial interviews with
the stakeholders, similar concerns had been expressed, so it appeared that the previous
three meetings had helped to establish an understanding of these goals amongst the
participants. One stakeholder suggested that the following are crucial to the process:
shared goals and objectives, necessity of trust, and necessity of respect. An alternative
explanation as to why this discussion appeared limited is that the participants were overly
familiar with the site and the workings of the group that the process goals were assumed.
6.2.3 Roles of the Participants
To establish a sense of accountability and responsibility for the decision amongst the
participants, the roles must be clear and agreed upon. Regarding their role, the
stakeholders raised concerns over the metric that might be used to determine whether they
themselves adhere to the role throughout the process. For instance, one stakeholder was
concerned that he might not actually be able to influence the decision maker's choice no
matter how actively he participated, and therefore worried, "I can't feel that I have
abdicated my role as stakeholder." Although these proposals were intended to be a
baseline from which the discussion of roles could ensue, many of the stakeholders
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interpreted our presentation as forcing these roles on them. The communication of
suggestions to stakeholders is a delicate process. Trust and understanding of the roles of
the participants can help this process. Trust seemed to develop over the iterative process
and allowed the mediator to easily elaborate on the presentation of the roles. They were
primarily concerned with having time to express their opinions on any and all matters
discussed. Early on in the decision making process, the responsibility of the stakeholders
should be expressed with the stakeholders in the deliberative sense, in parallel with the
discussion of the roles of the other participants.
The stakeholders were in agreement with the roles of the mediator and analysts. The
minimal discussion on these roles may be due to the fact that the stakeholders were well
acquainted with the mediator and analyst as a result of the iterative meetings, or it may be
a function of apathy on the part of the stakeholders. Although the eight month time frame
was discussed with the stakeholders at the first meeting, it might not have been
internalized by the participants, as the project had originally had eleven stakeholders,
however, by the consensual deliberation phase, only six stakeholders were actively
participating.
6.3 Deliberation Conduct
Once the pre-deliberation phase was complete, the discussion evolved into a question and
learning process aimed towards the goals mutually defined in the pre-deliberation. Since
the stakeholders are responsible for the definition of the goals and rules, their stake in the
process is strengthened. The mediator had the lead role in guiding discussion in an
efficient fashion to help the stakeholders reach their goal. Culminating from the iterative
process, the consensual deliberation began with the presentation of the assumptions and
the results of the integration. The stakeholders were eager to begin and to express their
views on the integration and rankings, however, the review of the assumptions was vital in
bringing all the participant, including the analysts to the same starting point or, reference
frame.
The mediator and the court reporter both spoke up to stress the importance to speak one at
a time. The stakeholders stated that they wanted to see the actual descriptions of each of
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the RAAs once again. The mediator reiterated the goals of the deliberation and assured
the stakeholders that each would have an opportunity to address the integration results
and other issues that my arise during deliberation.
6.3.1 Review of the Assumptions
Although a comprehensive review of the assumptions was not planned it flowed from the
early discussion in the deliberation that such a review was needed. At the commencement
of the deliberation, some of the stakeholders disagreed with the results that had been
mailed to them; for example, many immediately took issue with the high ranking of RAA
F, "no action," which, according to the integration analysis, was ranked first by most
stakeholders. One of the participants" raised the issue that he wanted to see the view
graphs that described the RAAs. All of the stakeholders agreed. The analyst responsible
for Programmatic Issues presented the slides reviewing the RAAs. Some of the
stakeholders spoke out in a disorderly fashion, expressing their concerns:
* "I am very concerned about TCE reaching the groundwater and do not want the
"no action" alternative."
* "'No action' is not my preferred option." This stakeholder went on to imply that
she felt that the mediator was attempting to impose his own preference for no
action on the stakeholders.
At this point the mediator reassured the participants that each would have the opportunity
to review and discuss all the results, stressing the openness of the process. As the review of
the RAAs were presented, the following observations and comments were made by one of
the analysts:
* We should have qualified the "No Action" alternative to mean "No
action beyond the current VCMs." At the present time, SNL is
implementing corrective measures which remove some of the
17 Participant is a person who came and listened and participated in some of the sessions yet was unable to
participate in the entire process
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contaminated soil. The assumption used in the analyses is that the "No
Action" alternative occurs after the VCM has been completed. Many of
the stakeholders had not realized that the assessments were carried out
based on the assumption that the current VCMs were completed.
Restating this assumption, helped to clarify the reasons behind the
ranking of RAA F as first.
* Did the team pick the right starting point? The analysts inquired into
their own methodology of assessment, given this broad
misunderstanding of the assumptions.
* What were the baseline assumptions? The stakeholders continued to
express a confusion over the basic assumptions of the assessment,
despite the fact that these assumptions had been explained at the first
meeting.
* Were all the stakeholders starting with the same assumptions in
mind? The framing of a situation influences an individual's perception
and subsequent choices in any decision making process, consequently, it
is of the utmost concern that in risk laden decisions the stakeholders
(decision makers) are operate under the same assumptions.
The participant raised a question directly to the others, "Are you satisfied that these two
viewgraphs (those presented by the analyst) are complete enough for us to have a
deliberation?" This stakeholder left after the break and did not return. It is difficult to
gauge at what point the mediator or intervenor should accept responsibility for the
stakeholder's apparent unwillingness to participate. We can only say that the
responsibilities and commitments should be explicit from the start, and reiterated often in
a non-dictatorial fashion. This requires that the mediator be well-trained and adept at
such tasks.
The answers to the participant's question, " Are you satisfied that these two view graphs
(those presented by the analysts) are complete enough for us to have a deliberation?"
varied; some felt comfortable with the graphs, while others indicated that they needed
more explanation. Reiterating the assumptions and elaborating on the graphs through
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interactive face-to-face discussion eased the flow of the deliberation which began somewhat
sporadically with the stakeholders eager to express their concerns and issues that they had
either with the integration methodology or the results. Some of the incipient comments
include:
"I am having a tough time separating my two hats" This stakeholder (#6)
was referring to her duel positions, one as citizen representative, and second,
as an employee of the National Laboratory.
"I don't want stuff trucked off because that is just as dangerous."
"I am looking at it from a non scientific perspective and sometimes that is
difficult." This stakeholder (#4) was fairly quiet throughout the entire
deliberation.
At one point, when the mediator was discussing the assumptions, one of the stakeholders
got up from her seat and handed him a marker, saying, "Write it down!" an indication that
some stakeholders need to see things visually.
The assumptions that were written on the flip charts in front of the room as they were
reviewed:
* All actions at the CWL are post VCMs
* The first fifteen feet of soil have been removed
* The first fifteen feet have been replaced with clean soil
* Soil vapor extraction is being conducted - 20% of the original amount
of TCE remains
* Some of the remaining TCE is still in liquid form
* No TCE has been removed from the groundwater
* On-site disposal refers to CAMU on-site facility'8
* Off-site disposal refers to a site in the state of Utah
* Scenario ZI: the closest public receptor is fifty feet away, with
residential/agricultural development
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* Scenario Z2: the closest receptor is three miles away; federal control,
and industrial development (This scenario is used as the "No Action"
alternative, RAA F)
Concerning these assumptions, the stakeholders stated that more information and
clarification of land use, both present and future, was necessary. One SH (#5), employed at
SNL, brought up the fact that, in his work at SNL, the definitions of on-site and off-site
differed from those used by TWG, again, stressing the need for consistent clarification and
reiteration of the assumptions and definitions. Studies on mediation point out that
securing a sufficient "group memory" is important in laying the groundwork for a
successful deliberation (Doyle, 1976; Moore, 1981). This can be done for example by
utilizing a note taker, involving the stakeholders in an interactive discussion which is
collaborative seemed to help group memory in that certain stakeholders were able to better
recall certain data from the previous discussions.
The participant representing the National Laboratories, Community Involvement Division
brought up the following points for the mediators consideration:
* Clarification between CWL and other sites
* A hypothetical site vs. a real site
* SH values and concerns
The mediator reiterated the aim of the project: to integrate the results of risk assessments
into deliberation, raising the question to the stakeholders, "How do we do it without
becoming overly technical? We hope that we can become specific and show the main
drivers..."
At this point, one stakeholder challenged the mediator. The stakeholder expressed his
concern that, "the decision maker does the community a disservice, if they can't articulate
technical information," and then asked the mediator to restate the concern as he, the
mediator, understood it. The mediator, in a calm and neutral fashion, stated, "I think that
you don't want the descriptions to become to technical. You want the analysts to present
18 See Appendix 3 on CAMU
107
the results in an understandable fashion. We have to somehow build a bridge between the
technical people and the stakeholders."
6.3.2 Discussion of the Integration Results
Once the assumptions were clarified, the mediator then began the discussion of the
integration results. It was necessary, for the mediator to raise the question of anonymity to
the group, rather than proceed with an assumption that the stakeholders would not mind
having their identities shown to the group. The stakeholders agreed that the individual
rankings could be shown to the group with the corresponding names attached to each
graph. Since the stakeholders were been invested in the process from the beginning, this
agreement was expected. However, as the decision is theirs and not that of the mediator,
the mediator had the responsibility to offer the stakeholders the opportunity to decide on
such an issue. These graphs, indicating each stakeholder ranking of the RAAs with the
associated uncertainty bars were place on the overhead projector, as the names were
inserted. In a systematic fashion, the mediator discussed the integration results with each
stakeholder. The overheads which were presented were the culmination of the graphs of
each stakeholder had received prior to deliberation, and are shown in Appendix 1. The
subject of discussion expanded around the relevant points and the new issues were open
for discussion, if so deemed by the group. The analysts and mediator served to support and
lend credence to issues that were raised. The integration results provide a trail map,
stringing together the most relevant issues.
Details of the Deliberation
Throughout the deliberation, the stakeholders revised their rankings of the alternatives
(Table 6.la-e), and discussed alternatives. A detailed description of the discussion is
presented below in the sequence followed in the actual deliberation.
Stakeholder #4
Many of the stakeholders voiced their opposition to RAA E, excavation and off-site
treatment and disposal, for the reason that it simply would move the problem elsewhere
and they did not feel that that would be a responsible alternative (to burden another
community). When the first stakeholder(#4) was asked whether the rankings correctly
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identified his preferences, he said he was surprised at the high ranking of RAA E. The
reasons why he would prefer RAA E were that he had placed a high value on low cost, yet
had also placed a significant preference weight on Impact on Local Economy (.04), and as
such, seemed to prefer E over F, the "no-action" alternative. Again, the cost of the RAA has
a direct correlation with "Impact of Local Economy," since it was the cost of the technology
that would bring more tax revenues to the town (see Appendix 3). In the area of
completion costs, the stakeholder preferred F and E. When the stakeholder asked for more
detail, we were able to provide him with the reasons from the contributor analysis:
Completion Costs, Process Waste Generated and Long-term Public Health Risks. The
analysts provided support from their risk assessments, demonstrating for example that
RAA E based on the scenario assumptions, had a favorable result in regards to Long Term
Public Health Risk, because it excavated and removed all of the contaminated soil.
Although the stakeholder agreed with the reasons stated and the representation of his
preferences, in the process of discussing the finer details of the RAAs and the external
factors, such as the undesirability of simply moving the problem elsewhere, he chose to
eliminate RAA E from his top ranking.
Rank Itegrated evised
1 E E
2 F C/D
3 C
4 D F
5 B B
6 A A
Table 6.1a Stakeholder #4
Stakeholder #1
The next Stakeholder (#1) asserted that she would choose neither E nor F, which had, in
fact, been the apparent top two ranked alternatives according to her preference weights
and elicited ranges. She was opposed to E, because it would put a lot of people at risk. The
analyst confirmed this, which substantiated the stakeholder's claim in the presence of the
group. In accordance with her position in the community, as a Realtor she expressed her
concern regarding the contaminant in the as it pertained to the construction of homes on
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the site. At this point, the analyst spoke up, reminding the stakeholder of the two
scenarios under which the evaluations were conducted. The stakeholder remained
committed to her presently expressed preferences, thereby re-ranking alternatives F and
E. She, then, had a difficult time discerning between RAAs C and D. And, although the
reasons she gave against RAA E are also found in RAA D, she initially maintained that she
wanted RAA D ranked first. The analyst spoke up to aide the stakeholder in
distinguishing between the various alternatives. She again expressed a strong preference
for the removal of the contaminant from the ground. Initially, she wanted all the
contaminants out of the ground, yet through group discussion it seemed that she became
convinced that Cr did not present the same risks as TCE. It was this preference that
caused E to be ranked high in the integration rankings since it removed everything,
indiscriminately, from the site; however, the underlying ethical concern in regards to
transferring the problem of waste remediation to another location was not identified
through the rankings. She seemed to heed the advice of some of the other stakeholders, as
well as of one analyst in particular. The familiarity between the participants enhanced the
group understanding and seemed to foster a commitment to one another. Although we
were able to explain the primary characteristics of the RAA which the stakeholder's
preferences indicated to be detrimental or undesirable, there were some underlying issues
that arose during deliberation that were unable to be captured in the quantitative
assessment alone, such as the base line criteria of wanting the contaminant removed in its
entirety from the site. This issue could only ensue from discussion. Her original
preference weights indicated that the Objective Category, "Worker Health Risk" was
weighted equally with "Environment"; however, in discussion it seemed that she preferred
a lower public health risk - attribute of the "Environment" Category(see Figure 4.1 ID1,
Chapter 4 ) over "Worker Health and Safety". This verbal expression of her preferences is a
reversal from her initially elicited preferences.
Rank Integrated Revis ed,
1 F D
2 E C
3 C F
4 B AorB
5 D E
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Ra tegrated Revised
6 A
Table 6. lb Stakeholder #1
Stakeholder #2
The next stakeholder (#2) stated, as she had done consistently throughout the process,
that, if she had had access to the risk impacts of each RAA, she would have weighted her
preferences differently. "I would have adjusted the weights depending on what the
analyses showed." When asked, however, about the ranking of the alternatives, she stated
that it was accurate based on the preferences she had provided previously. She felt that
had she known that certain Performance Measures were not discriminating across the
alternatives, she would have redistributed her weights. In response, the mediator
explained the concept of relative preferences and asked if the remainder of the weight
would be distributed evenly across those PMs that were discriminators, and if so, whether
this would result in the same calculation. She did go on to reassess her rankings, finding
the results shown below. She was the only stakeholder to make use of the on-site analysis
capability. It seemed that the access to the actual program used to compute her rankings,
and the freedom to vary her inputs in real time authenticated the process while
establishing a bridge between the stakeholders and technology.
Wzank Integrated Calculated Revised.
1 E F E
2 F E C/D
3 C B
4 D C F
5 B D B
6 A A A
Table 6. ic Stakeholder #2
Stakeholder #6
The next stakeholder (#6), a representative of the Community Advisory Board (CAB),
brought up the issue of risk and the fact that there was a difference between assessed and
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public perception of risk. This led to a discussion of the choice of the prototype site, which
caused her to feel obliged to act on behalf of the public. "At the Chemical Waste Landfill
public perception of the problem is not good; although risks may now be minimal, the long
term problem overshadows the issues." She felt that as a member and representative of the
CAB, she could not choose the "no action" alternative. "I cannot ignore my role as
representative of the public." The mediator asked the stakeholder directly, "Whom are you
trying to represent?" She expressed a concern as to her personal understanding of the
issues and the fact that they might conflict with the views of the people she was
representing. She wanted clarification as to whom she ought to represent in the context of
this project. As the Community Advisory Board representative, she was quite frank about
the attitude of the public towards DOE. The Department of Energy has made mistakes in
the past and is now "paying a price for past sins." In reference to the opposition to a no
action alternative, she stated, "I have heard too many opinions against a "no action"
alternative, that I put it low." She was referring to the public's demand for some type of
action on the part of DOE.
As a member of CAB, this stakeholder was very knowledgeable about the costs and
technologies of the RAAs, since she had participated in prior stakeholder involvement
activities. She held some very strong opinions about many of the RAAs. Particularly, she
did not think that RAA E made sense since it transported the problem elsewhere. The
issue of ethics apparent in this concern, especially in light of the recent NIMBY cases
(Hamilton, 1996), is somewhat surprising. Other stakeholders also agreed that RAA E was
not preferable, since it would not be fair to simply transplant the problem elsewhere. This
value was another which was difficult to quantify, yet, through the stakeholders'
disagreement with the results of the integration, although admittedly logical, the
stakeholders clearly explained why they did not prefer E. Her knowledge of the site and
participation in previous stakeholder involvement groups enabled this stakeholder to
express the exact reason why she did not like certain aspects of a given RAA. Referring to
RAA A, she stated, "I don't like in-situ vitrification because it is a bad idea to vitrify soil
and leave it in the ground." Here the mediator pointed out that the Performance Measures
themselves were not the sole preferences that a stakeholder wanted to express about the
alternatives. This was an important point in developing future strategies out of this
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methodology. One of the analysts raised the issue of selection of the Performance
Measures, "Did we choose the wrong PMs? Could we have defined a different set?" The
CAB representative went on to explain that ISV changes the ecosystem and she was
strongly against such a change.
Table 6. d Stakeholder #6
Stakeholder #5
The last stakeholder to discuss his rankings, was somewhat surprised. After a discussion
of the assumption, we learned that he was operating off of a very different set of
assumptions. This was admittedly because he was not present in the first of the
stakeholder meetings in which the descriptions of the RAAs were presented in entirety. He
clarified that fact that the RAAs were evaluated after the current VCMs and indicated that
had he understood this, his rankings might have differed. Based on his technical expertise,
he was quite confident that he was not at all interested in any technology which had in-situ
vitrification. His reasons for opting for a combination of B and A were based on his
preferences, as elicited, however, the integration did not indicate this ordering. This is
primarily because of a misunderstanding of what the basic assumptions in the assessments
were. This stakeholder was instrumental in recommending alternative RAAs. He also had
gained the respect and trust of the other stakeholders. His familiarity with remediation
issues, was evident in the insights he provided, for example, when the analysts clarified
certain assumptions, this stakeholder spoke challenging the validity of the assumption,
based on his current work with the site. Again, we see here the need for continual, concise
and clear representation of the assumptions, which is aided by consistent participation by
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Ranking
1 F Al and B2
2 E A with B
3 B D
4 C C and F
5 D
6 A E - not
responsible as an
alternative
the stakeholders. This stakeholder also provided insights into stakeholder communication
and expressed concern that the stakeholders were adequately calibrated.
Table 6. le Stakeholder #5
6.3.3 Points of Consensus
Once each stakeholder had had the opportunity to discuss their individual results with the
mediator and the others in the group, there was consensus on the following issues in
regards to the technologies and integration:
1. Dislike of in-situ vitrification of RAA A
2. Dislike of "No Action" alternative
3. Dislike for RAA E: agreement not to transport waste to other communities
4. Cr is not a primary concern for long term health, therefore the stakeholders
were willing to tradeoff more Cr left in the ground for less TCE left in the ground
Of the proposals found in Table 5.4.2, the stakeholders agreed with proposal one, RAA A
should not be selected, and also with proposal two that D is less preferred than C. They
adamantly disagreed with proposal four which stated, "F is a candidate to be a preferred
alternative" primarily because they felt that action of some sort was necessary and that
long term public health risk must be considered. We did not discuss proposals five and six.
The substance oriented goals were achieved in the sense that the stakeholders reached an
agreement as to what to present to DOE regarding the remedial action at the Chemical
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Waste Landfill. Furthermore, the important tradeoffs between the original six RAAs were
put into context through the integration which allowed a meaningful discussion around
the most relevant risks, as determined by the stakeholder preferences. Consensus was
achieved on the following points:
I. RAA A should not be selected
* Both worker and short term public health risks are high due to airborne Chromium
particulates released
* All stakeholders put a high value on worker health risk and thus did not like the
high risk of worker injuries that accompanied the original RAA A.
* High Completion Costs
* In-situ vitrification causes irreversible geological changes
II. C+ is better than D, yet this is not to be included in the recommendation
III. F+ is a candidate to be the preferred alternative
IV. F should not be selected
V. A+ is a candidate to be the preferred alternative
VI. E should not be selected because of the ethics of shifting the problem to another
area
VII. B should not be selected
Based on the tradeoffs and technologies discussed, the stakeholders collaborated,
generating new alternatives that were hybrids of the original six alternatives. Some
stakeholders proposed hybrid alternatives that would in essence do away with the
components of the RAAs that were least preferred. The hybrids that were proposed
include:
Excavation and thermal desorption
of organics to be disposed of off-site
Soil stabilization of metals (Cr) with
on site treatment
Soil Vapor Extraction of TCE
(No in-situ vitrification)
Continue with VCMs as indicated in
Off site disposal of
organics (TCE)
rather than on-site
No in-situ
vitrification
Added action of
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A+
F+
the bas assumptions, with the focused soil vapor
addition of focused soil vapor extraction on the
extraction on the TCE in liquid form TCE in liquid form
Table 6.2: Hybrid RAAs
F+ takes care of the TCE problem which the stakeholders decided was a prime concern,
while minimizing process waste and addressing the concerning amongst all stakeholders
about worker health risk. Although it did not do anything about Cr, the stakeholders were
satisfied that Cr is a minimal risk at this site. Additionally, in the deliberation, a quick
calculation indicated that this would cost less.
The next issue for discussion was the form of the recommendation to DOE. Which of these
proposals should be included in the recommendation? Should just the top two proposals be
recommended? One stakeholder(#2) suggested that F+ be recommended over A+ because:
* The cost /benefits are not worth it to address Cr which was the
main difference between the two alternatives.
* Over time, evidence indicated that Cr6 deteriorates to Cr3, which
was of minimal risk. This statement was confirmed by the analyst.
The representative from Sandia (#5) agreed with this recommendation, as did all the other
stakeholder. Consensus was reached that F+ was the first preferred alternative and that
A+ was the second. In addition, it was agreed that this was to be the recommendation to
the DOE. Upon reaching this consensus, the analysts and mediator initiated a feedback
discussion on the methodology itself, of which the lessons learned can be found in greater
detail in the following section.
6.3.3 The Stakeholders' Relationship
Further insight into the benefits of deliberation can come from observations of the group
interactions and decision making behavior. Although groups interact uniquely, an
awareness of potential areas of interaction can be helpful in formulating future
deliberation strategies.
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This group of stakeholders was very familiar with the site and the previous actions that
had been taken. One stakeholder suggested that the fact the site was real and there were
actually remedial actions taking place made it difficult for the stakeholders to separate the
prototypical RAA issues from what was actually occurring at the site. This also may have
clouded the stakeholders understanding of the assumptions.
Throughout the process (both pre-deliberation meetings and the deliberation), the
stakeholders seemed to develop a teamwork type attitude in which they worked together to
try to reach an agreement. At times throughout the deliberation process, the stakeholders
seemed to become upset with the analysts and the mediator. One of the stakeholders felt
the mediator had imposed his own preferences on the rankings of the alternatives. She
appeared determined not to accept the rankings that had been calculated; however she was
willing to listen to the opinions of the other stakeholders, specifically concerning the issues
that were most important to her.
It was explained to her that the mediator was only presenting the results of the
calculations that were based on stakeholder inputs. The mediator did not include his views
in the tentative proposals (Table 5.4.2). It seemed that this stakeholder was suspicious.
The stakeholders also developed a concern for one another and a desire to ensure that all
understood the material presented. This concern can also be attributed to an individual's
concern that his/her own desires are the most understood to the extent that the group
decides to prioritize the concerns of that specific stakeholder. Upon leaving one
stakeholder made a comment concerning this stakeholder's ability to understand some of
the more abstract technical data; he suggested that possible calibration techniques be used
to familiarize the stakeholders with the technical data.
The camaraderie displayed by some of these stakeholders will not be found in all
deliberations and it is important, to note that while it seems to benefit the process, the
stakeholders may have additional responsibilities to their respective groups that create
inner conflicts.
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6.4 Deliberation Interactions Analysis
There are a number of interactions that occur throughout a deliberation process. These
interactions begin with the initial problem definition and evolve, like all relationships, over
time. As such, decision maker, as well as the mediator, must be attuned to the possible
responses and perceptions the participants will have and develop, not only of one another,
but also of the agency and the mediator. These issues are the quintessence of developing
trust between the community and the agency, as well as between the mediator, the
analysts and the participants.
6.4.1 The Relationship of the Stakeholders with the Analysts
The stakeholders seemed to develop in some cases a trusting relationship with the analysts
and yet in some cases a skepticism regarding the intentions of the analysts. Initially, the
stakeholders seemed to feel that the analysts were actually members of the Department of
Energy and, therefore, not neutral third parties. This sentiment should be carefully
assessed so as not to further the mistrust between the agency and the stakeholders. In the
actual deliberation, the stakeholders listened to the analysts' explanation of the
calculations and openly asked questions of the analysts, concerning both the assessed
alternatives as well as the proposed hybrid alternatives.
At times, perhaps due to the fact that the project was in itself a prototype development
project, the stakeholders demonstrated a sense of dissatisfaction with the analysts. There
were similarly times when the analysts were uncertain how to proceed and consequently
demonstrated their uncertainty in the presence of the stakeholders. The stakeholders in
some regards seemed to look to the analysts for the "answers" which actually detracted
from the joint fact-finding of the process. The aim of joint problem solving, however, could
have been stated with greater clarity early on in the decision making process, and perhaps
could have alleviated some of the stakeholders concerns.
The iterative meetings allowed the stakeholders to become accustomed to the analysts.
This seemed to create an environment where both the analysts and stakeholders could
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openly question and discuss the facts of the decision. As the analysts grew to know the
stakeholders better, they were able to assess how to communicate the relevant facts better.
There are drawbacks to an iterative process in that, although on one hand the relationship
becomes more intimate, on the other, if there are personality conflicts between the
stakeholders and the analysts, the relationship could be detrimental to the project. The
participation of a group of analysts and stakeholders may help to mitigate such a down
side.
6.4.2 Stakeholders and the Mediator
The mediator presented the results of the inputs and risk assessments. The mediator's
role was neutral and yet informed, as the mediator was responsible for the integration of
the stakeholders' preferences and the risk assessments. Some of the stakeholders took
issue with the mediator concerning this integration. The stakeholders' disagreements with
the ranking results led some of the stakeholders to question the motives of the mediator.
The mediator delicately explained that the results were starting points for the discussion
and would help elucidate the principal drivers which led to each ranking.
One of the stakeholders helped to support the mediator's neutrality by explaining to the
skeptical stakeholder how the integration was done and that the mediator had no vested
interest in falsifying the results. The skeptical stakeholder took issue with the fact that
the mediator came from a different part of the country, when although unbeknownst the
this stakeholder, the mediator originated from her side of the country.
Pre-judgments are in all of us, they are what help us to survive. Without a preconceived
notion of something, we would always be in a position of having to relearn. Prejudices can
be detrimental however when they cause us to take a narrow and judgmental view of some
one or something. This is a very real aspect of deliberation and it is up to the organizing
agency and mediator to caution against this in the deliberation.
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6.4.3 Inter Stakeholder Relations
The stakeholder relationships in this project evolved over eight months, some even longer
since four of the stakeholders had been involved in a similar decision making project in the
past. This led to an unusual amount of familiarity amongst the stakeholders. In some
instances, there was a great deal of comfort amongst the stakeholders. Some had open
conversations, frequently chatting during the breaks. There were other stakeholders who
remained quiet and not as outgoing. When some stakeholders had to leave early, it was a
bit surprising that none of the others openly resented this. The stakeholders tried to
explain different technical presentations to one another and, at times, seemed to trust the
stakeholders' input over the analysts. There were three technically trained stakeholders,
active throughout the process, who also served to corroborate the analysts' input.
6.4.4 Stakeholder Expectations
The stakeholders developed a feeling that their recommendation would be used by DOE.
One stakeholder, in particular, continually asked whether the analysts could guarantee
that his input would be utilized, despite the fact that the mediator reiterated that while
the site of the evaluation was real, the integration methodology and use of risk assessment
and deliberation is a prototype. Some stakeholders wanted to be reassured that what they
provided was actually incorporated and were slightly confused when the results of the
integration did not display the results they expected. Once the moderator explained that
the process is iterative and that they could continually change their preferences without
being "chastised," the stakeholders slowly became more comfortable - or so it seemed.
6.5 Discussion of Deliberation Goals
The substance goals: reaching a recommendation for the remediation of the site that
satisfies the concerns of the stakeholders and is technically and financially feasible, and
the process goals: addressing the concerns of the stakeholders, maintain the integrity of
their preferences, and ensuring a fair and efficient process, are discussed in this section.
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6.5.1 Substance Goals
In terms of substance, the integration and risk assessment of the impacts and stakeholder
preferences, allowed for the following:
* Systematic presentation of the major contributors, causes, and
tradeoffs
* Focus on the interests of the stakeholders
* Prioritization of the most important risks, as perceived/valued by the
stakeholders
* Starting point for the generation of creative alternatives
A key question to ask is whether the stakeholders could have proposed these alternatives
without the results of the integration method. If so, to what extent? As discussed by Fisher
and Ury, the main goal of a successful negotiation is to focus on interests rather than
positions [1981]. The proposals helped the group to deliberate on the merits and demerits
of the alternatives in question. This approach does not gloss over the disagreements for
the sake of the "relationship", nor does it focus singularly on the positions of one party.
Focusing on the interests of the stakeholders as related to the technologies and site specific
questions brought out the specific issues of concern for each stakeholder, as seen in the
discussion of the integration results. Although the integration methodology alone cannot
predict the substantive agreement which all stakeholders will agree [Arrow, 1951], the
combination of early involvement and technical analyses integrated the values into the
decision process. While the project's underlying goal was to integrate stakeholder values
and risk assessments into the decision making process, separating the "people from the
problem [Ury, 1981]" permitted a discussion centered on the issue of remediation, rather
than possible personal issues, like the realtor's need to build homes, or the Sandia
representative's interest in future employment, and yet it allowed the expression and
integration of these values through genuine participation. Moreover, not only are the
results of the integration important, but equally important is the presentation of these
results and the openness and perspective with which they are discussed. The sole fact
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that integration results are obtained is not sufficient to reach a democratic and fair
decision but rather must be interwoven in a tapestry of deliberation.
Arriving at the recommendations, the information that the mediator presented was useful
in aiding the timing of the presentation of risk related information. As discussed
previously, framing and timing of risk data is one of the most challenging obstacles facing
policy makers. By receiving the information ahead of time, the stakeholders were prepared
to ask questions and provide input concerning the rankings, how they were determined,
and whether or not they chose to change their preferences.
Changes were made in the midst of the deliberation as to what type of alternative best met
the interests of the stakeholders. For instance, stakeholder #4 thought that he was in
agreement with the other stakeholders, however, the integration of the rankings indicated
that he preferred RAA E significantly more than the other stakeholders. When he asked for
more details, from the mediators, we were able to return to his original preferences and
indicate how those preferences influenced the ranking and the fact that he preferred
Impact on Local Economy and strongly led to the high preference for RAA E. He indicated
that although he still felt that Process Waste and Impact on Local Economy were
important, he was willing to compromise for the benefit of the group, "We are trying to
reach a recommendation(as a group)." This speaks to one of the benefits of face-to-face
negotiation and the process of group decision making, as opposed to a hierarchical,
separated process, by combining analytical integration in deliberation the trades were
made explicit. This combined with group defined goals and groundrules helps to open
discussion.
During deliberation, alternative RAAs were created, once the baseline assumptions were
clearly understood. Ideally, the framing and mutual comprehension of the assumptions
will occur early in the decision making process, however given the multiple stakeholder
approach, open discussion and deliberation, rather than simplistic presentation of the
assumptions is vital to attaining such comprehensive understanding of the assumptions.
As such processes bring together a range of individuals, some of whom have little or no
previous contact or connection with one another, it is fruitless to expect that all the
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stakeholders will completely understand, or care to try to understand the perspective,
background or viewpoint of any of the other stakeholders. The substance and logical
structure is thus called for if one hopes to achieve a feasible solution to a decision problem
involving multiple stakeholders. The final recommendation was agreed to by all
stakeholders and the analysts agreed to re-evaluate the new alternatives.
6.5.2 Process Goals
The main element of process goals is fairness. Did all the stakeholders have the
opportunity to discuss and present their views? Fairness must be substantiated by the
participants involved. The opportunity for discussion should be sincere and open. In
negotiations, as it can occur that certain participants dominate the discussion, it is often
the role of the mediator to guard against this dominance and present a forum for equal
opportunity to participate. Since individuals all have different forms of learning and
expression the mediator may also want to adjust the participation settings to accounts for
any observed or implied limitations to complete participation of the stakeholders. The
substance, or information gathering component of a deliberative process helped to ensure
an equal representation of the stakeholders involved. By a systematic elicitation of the
preferences, we ensured equal representation to a certain extent of the quantitative
assessment, however the drawback to this method is the accuracy of that elicitation for
each individual. Additionally, they were able to change their preferences regarding the
quantitative input all the way through the decision-making process, including the
deliberation. Through assisted deliberation, the mediator worked to ensure equal
opportunity for the stakeholders to express themselves in the deliberation. This, in itself,
is a difficult challenge, for the mediator must remain neutral, focused and flexible.
There seemed to have formed various levels of connections between certain participants,
for example, the apparent trust displayed by one stakeholder(#1) for the input of one of the
analysts. While simultaneously, she had little trust in the input from the mediation group.
Her reasoning was based on the assumption that the mediation group was from a different
geographical location and not in tune with the local problems. The camaraderie between
the stakeholders contributed in some respects to the efficiency of the process since it
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actually helped certain stakeholders improve their understanding of the situation, by
drawing on comments from those stakeholders more familiar with the site.
In terms of the wisdom, the forum of deliberation helped to draw out hidden objectives,
such as the ethical concerns and the questions of trust that were undetected by the
questionnaire form of elicitation. From this discussion, stakeholders had the opportunity
to change their rankings of the alternatives, even thought, they admittedly stated that
their preferences remained the same. Such a mathematical "inconsistency" cannot be
evaluated on a purely quantitative measure; interaction and discussion is vital.
Stakeholders are not normative, standardized super rational beings, however, a logical
foundation of the arguments does aid the decision making process and provides a
systematic framework for reaching an implementable solution [Sagoff, 1996; Dubos, 1991].
A main contributor to the wisdom of the deliberation was the integration methodology in
the sense that it focused the discussion on the interests and causes of differences, in a
systematic fashion, without getting caught in a morass of conflicting values and
arguments. Combined with a flexible, open deliberation the preceding steps for integration
help to establish relationships and trust amongst the stakeholders. The integration then
makes the tradeoffs explicit while addressing the preferences of the stakeholders. There
are criticisms to the overall fairness of such a consensual group process, in regards to the
quieter or weaker participant being granted the opportunity to express his or her views.
The integration method added an additional vehicle for the consideration of stakeholder
values which can be used by the agency to ensure that each stakeholder's concerns are
considered. This point touches on the role and responsibility of the agency (NRC, 1996).
The process goals seemed to be enhanced by the use of a court reporter. The presence of a
court reporter was accepted by the participants and served as a guide that only one person
should speak at a time. This certainly aided to the process goal of fairness and wisdom. It
was on the contrary, difficult to judge whether the stakeholders "actively listened" to one
another, although their awareness of the needs of the other participants seemed to indicate
that this was the case.
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Substance or outcome and process must be considered in parallel. Improving both
contributes to the overall wisdom of the decision making process. Similarly, the stability of
the decision, in other words its applicability to the site and its feasibility, is enhanced
through the ongoing interactive decision-making that brings together substance and
process. By opening the process to the stakeholders and providing the opportunity for an
interdisciplinary definition of the substance to be evaluated, as well as in the evaluation
method itself, the wrong assumptions are less likely to be made. Granted, not every
stakeholder will have, or want a say on every issue, as was indicated, when in the second
meeting one of the stakeholders (#1) simply yielded to the analysts for their "expert"
opinion concerning the amount of TCE in the ground, yet it was her voluntary choice.
Further issues in addressing the challenges of integrating substance and process, risk
assessment and values, are centered around: time constraints, stakeholder selection
methods, urgency, and budgetary restrictions. However, once the process is defined, the
openness and sincerity must come from the agency in charge, given that in this instance
the agency's role is well-defined and the product of the deliberation is a recommendation to
the agency.
6.6 Chapter Summary
The major points presented in this chapter are:
* In a deliberation the goals, groundrules and roles of participants should be discussed
explicitly.
* Resources and information should be readily available to all participants prior to
deliberation.
* Integration and major contributor analyses lead to tentative conclusions which helped
structure the deliberation around the stakeholder interests and relevant tradeoffs in
regards to the site remediation.
* The deliberation was conducted in a manner which integrated the concepts of fairness
and efficiency by drawing on the integration of the stakeholder preferences and risk
assessments. The deliberation provide the needed complement to the quantitative
analyses.
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* Group decision making process are not the simple aggregate of individuals but rather
are the product of interactions of the participants striving to reach a common objective
although the individual values and methods may be different.
* Integration provided the necessary structure to the deliberation so that the discussion
focused on the individual interests as the manifested in the RAAs, and presented a
rational discussion of the tradeoffs involved in environmental decision making.
* Stakeholders worked together to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties, finding
consensus first on the least acceptable alternatives and proceeding to create new
alternatives based on the illuminated tradeoffs, technical analyses, and cooperation.
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CHAPTER 7: RISK COMMUNICATION INSIGHTS
"The breakdown in communication is complete only when the concepts
cannot be related to human experience. The physicist, the biologist and the
humanist and the lay person can all find common ground for discourse if they
talk about matter, life, or humanity as perceived by the senses or as
apprehended in the for of images, analogies and responses..." -Rene Dubos,
1965
Much of the controversy and loss of trust in agencies involved with environmental
decision making can be traced to issues of risk communication, whether it is a result
of perception, poor communication techniques, or a neglect of fundamental concerns
of the affected parties. Deliberation itself is a communication tool, and when
accompanied by supplementary visual aids improves the communication process.
This Section will discuss the communication and discussion of risk in deliberation,
as well as those elements of the analytic-deliberative process which supported the
deliberation.
7.1 Influence Diagrams
The tools we used for communication began with the influence diagrams (IDs) at the
first stakeholder meeting. The use of influence diagrams also conveyed the
stakeholders' concerns to the analysts so that their values could be synthesized into
the risk assessments, thereby strengthening the foundation of those assessments
and eliminating the tendency to overlook the non-objective judgments, whose
omission often lies at the root of the controversies in environmental decisions
[Stone, 1996; Sagoff, 1992]. These were successful in helping the stakeholders and
analysts outline the goals, which provided support to the deliberation in the form of
understanding and acknowledgment of the main issues. Cooperative construction of
the IDs allowed the stakeholders to examine the directs inputs into the analyses, as
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they define them.19 The deliberation aspect permits the stakeholders to question the
diagrams and debate the various assumptions. In terms of decision making theory,
the influence diagrams also aid the analytical process of evaluating the stakeholder
preferences[Keeney, 1996].
Furthermore, the use of marker boards, or real time visualization tools seemed to
make the stakeholders more comfortable and confident that their opinions were
actually being noted and incorporated. It also provided the analysts and mediator
with guidance throughout the deliberation as to what issues were discussed and
what perhaps needed to be raised.
7.2 Timeliness of pre-deliberation material
Early notification of analytical results prepared the stakeholders and the analysts
for the possible discussions and questions that may arise during the deliberation.
This pre-meeting information helped communicate the results by providing the
stakeholders with the additional time necessary to read through the material and
compare it with the facts of the site and previous meetings and discussions. It also
guaranteed that the mediator was prepared to answer preliminary questions and
concerns regarding the integration of the stakeholder preferences and risk
assessments.
7.3 Graphs and Diagrams
Communication through graphs and diagrams was best received when the presenter
was able to have the attention of the group and had rehearsed the presentation of
the material. The analysts' presentation of the assessment scenarios were well
received by the participants during deliberation. These diagrams detailed the
exposure pathways that were analyzed, using pictures and familiar representations.
In deliberation, clear and explicit descriptions that can be understood by all parties
19 The IDs should be drawn as neatly and concisely as possible. Care should be taken that they do not
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help establish trust and understanding. With the analysts and the mediators
present, the stakeholders have the opportunity to ask direct questions regarding the
descriptions, an element which can compensate for the potential misunderstanding,
or mis-framing that can occur if there is no "talk." "As the struggle to begin
conversation becomes purposeful, we understand how fugitive its foundations are
and how easily they can be subverted . Even with a foundation, we are not on a
straight or clear path. What it gives us is the minimal conditions for meaningful
disagreement (Laws, 1996)."
7.4 Elicitation
Analysts and agencies must elicit information from the stakeholders in the decision
making process, and depending on the complexity of the decision making method,
obtaining accurate information can be a substantial challenge it itself. Overall, we
found that the combination of verbal and written elicitation served to enhance
mutual understanding and made some of the issues more explicit which in turn
aided the deliberation in that the stakeholders and analysts were more aware of the
diverse range of concerns. Explicit descriptions and objectives pertaining to the use
of the elicited information help improve the trust between the parties by providing
an overall roadmap to the analytical-deliberative process.
7.5 Pre-deliberation Communication
Anonymous communication of the integration results was offered by the mediation
group. As mediators, we did not want to "force" the stakeholders to reveal their
identity in the communication of the analytical results during the negotiation,
although we did feel that in order to establish responsibility and a substantive
discussion, the stakeholders' identity in the presentation of results should be made
known to the group. It was important however that this was the group's decision.
become too detailed
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Another benefit of this tactic was that it helped to build trust between the
stakeholders and the mediator.
7.6 Risk Communication Summary
The key lessons to take from this project in regards to risk characterization and
communication are :
Clarify the assumptions early and often. All the participants, the stakeholders, the
analysts and the mediators will benefit from this. It will avoid long term problems,
enhance comprehension of the problem, and will help to eliminate unnecessary
calculations on the part of the analysts, for they will be more focused on the issues
of concerns. By continually presenting and reiterating the assumptions, the group
will be more likely to evaluate the situation from the same point of reference during
the deliberation. By involving the affected and interested parties in the generation
of these assumptions, the problems commonly blamed for poor, or rather contested,
decisions will be minimized, if not eliminated.
Visual aids help clarify what has been stated and how the process is evolving. The
initial tools, such as the influence diagrams, proved useful to the stakeholders, but
perhaps more so in communicating the stakeholders concerns to the analysts so that
the analysts could carry these concerns through their evaluation. This was evident
by the stakeholder who got up during deliberation and handed the mediator a
marker to write down the new assumptions as they arose. This strengthened the
group memory and minimizes discrepancies concerning the framing of the risks.
Calibrate the participants. All the participants, including the analysts and the
mediator, needed a frame of reference in order to participate to the best of their
ability. Although some stakeholders, particularly those familiar with the site, could
easily grasp the meaning of a ton of waste transported, or 3 parts per million (ppm)
of TCE in the groundwater, many, including the mediator, did not feel that they
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could provide input regarding a particular performance measure without
understanding the implications of the statement or measure.
Methods of comparisons and calibration vary, yet from this project, comparisons to
familiar events or situations was suggested as a useful tool. For instance, in
regards to the performance measure "Impact on Local Economy," comparing the
impact of the RAA to the impact felt by the annual ballooning festival worked well
as a calibrating mechanism, easily understood by all participants. Regarding the
more technical terminology, one stakeholder suggested during deliberation to
compare the amount of waste to be transported to the relative amount of dirt one
might use in planting a garden. There is a distinct difference between biasing the
stakeholders and simply educating the participants and ensuring that each is
starting his/her evaluation of the decision situation from the same page . As
discussed in Chapter 3, framing of the situation is one of the elements that
frequently leads to misunderstanding and associated problems, both legislatively
and technically.
Presentation of uncertainty should be accompanied by verbal descriptions and an
open discussion. Unlike many earlier negotiations, we opted to present the
uncertainty bars to the stakeholders, because we felt that some of the stakeholders
would be able to understand them. Moreover, with respect to process, it would be
inappropriate for us to judge which stakeholders could understand the graphs and
which could not, and, thus, we presented the graphs to all the stakeholders, along
with a complete qualitative analysis. In corporation with the open deliberation, the
uncertainty associated with the analyses could be explained. Most of the discussion,
however, did not focus on this uncertainty, perhaps because it was incorporated as
only one element of a more integrated, iterative deliberation process. If the
uncertainty graphs were to be employed without the benefits of deliberation, it is
unlikely that they would be helpful, on the contrary, they would probably serve to
create more controversy and distrust of science [Morgan, 1978; Osawa, 1992].
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Communication prior to deliberation aids the stakeholders in preparing for the
discussion. As many of the issues require thought and processing time, we found
that early communication of the integration results were helpful in preparing the
stakeholders for the deliberation. They came prepared with "questions." Such
information should be mailed about a week in advance; we, however, were unable to
meet this criteria, and consequently mailed the information 2-3 days prior to the
deliberation.
Information overload can occur when the analysts try to elicit too much information
from the stakeholders at one time. The variability in technical understanding must
be recognized and the desired input should be clearly stated to avoid confusion.
Stakeholders do have other commitments and we found that spending an exorbitant
amount of time on one area caused some of the stakeholders to lose interest.
Additionally, as stakeholders have other commitments, they were not always able to
stay for the entire deliberation, which detracted from our ability to get complete sets
of information from all of the stakeholders; as we were developing a prototype
methodology, we were able to improvise along these lines, however, these concerns
are real and should be heeded.
During the deliberation, the stakeholders were concerned with having the
opportunity to express things as they saw them. They needed reassurance that their
concerns and input was accounted for in the integration. One stakeholder
continually expressed here desire to be heard in a behavioral context, as opposed to
normative. The integration methodology begins to bridge the disjunction between
scientists and the public by both involving the public in a quantitative assessment
while simultaneously bringing the analysts into an open discussion with the public.
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CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATION
"The true development of human beings involves much more than mere
economic growth. At it heart there must be a sense of empowerment and
inner fulfillment. This alone will ensure that human and cultural values
remain paramount...People's participation in social and political
transformation is the central issue of our time..." - Aung San Suu Kyi,
Leader of Burma
As the Department of Energy continues its probe into new methods of stakeholder
involvement and integration, we look at the following elements:
* Integration as an aid to deliberation
* Deliberation as a method for communication and characterization of risks
* Deliberation as a mode to involve stakeholders: was it fair?
We look at deliberation in terms of its usefulness in risk characterization and
stakeholder involvement.
8.1 Integration as an aid to deliberation
In regards to deliberation, the integration provides a systematic process through
which the correlation between the stakeholder values and preferences and the
remedial action alternative can be made. This allows a prioritization of the major
tradeoffs for each stakeholder which can be used in structuring a deliberation.
The underlying assumptions here are that the stakeholders are able to accurately
provide their preferences to the analysts throughout the deliberative process; that
they understand the material presented; and are able to communicate and quantify
their preferences.
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Nonetheless the integration aids the mediator in developing strategies which focus
on the important contributors, as well as prepares a logical structure of the
potential areas of conflict between the stakeholders, so that in the event that
conflicts arise, the mediator will be able to negotiate appropriately, focusing on the
interests, not the people, so that a cooperative recommendation will be reached.
By allowing the stakeholders to change their preferences in the deliberation, the
integration method was not limited by the short comings of normative theory.
Although the ultimate rankings of the RAAs for each stakeholder were not as the
stakeholders expected, the analysis into the causes of those rankings: the major
contributors and tradeoffs, provided useful insights to focus the discussion on the
issues, both technical and social, pertinent to reaching a fair and efficient outcome.
8.1.1 Integration and the stakeholders
The integration method brought the risk assessments and stakeholder preferences
together in a logical format relevant to the problem. By combining the integration
with a face to face deliberation, the stakeholders could ask questions and express
their changes in their preferences. The mode of integration, allowed for an ongoing
process which helped to establish relationships and trust between the stakeholders;
given that some of these stakeholders were from National Laboratiories and others
were from the community, it seemed to also foster that relationship and perhaps
begin to establish trust between the groups of stakeholders. Similarly, the
interactive discussion format of presentation, rather that just written of pictorial
communications, proved very useful in building relationships between the
stakeholders and analysts.
Some of the remaining questions lie in the elicitation of preferences, the amount of
technical data that needs or should be communicated to the stakeholders. In using
a quantitative integration method, we required the stakeholders to quantify their
preferences for the objectives they, as a group, had defined. Some people have a
difficult time assessing elements they view as non -quantitative in a quantitative
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fashion. If such a method is to be used for stakeholder involvement, it must meet
the agreement of the stakeholders involved. One way to improve the acceptance of
such a model is to combine it with a qualitative or behavioral component, that
allows a dual expression of the stakeholders preferences. Granted, there will always
be an element of interpretation involved, if those preferences are assessed by
"analysts" and then regurgitated back to the stakeholders, for this reason, it must
be explicitly agreed upon that the final say and development of the recommendation
- the result from the integration - in this case a recommendation to DOE concerning
the remediation of the site (again keep in mind this is part of a prototype
development), is that of the stakeholders.
8.1.2 Improvements to the integration with respect to deliberation
As a method of prioritizing the risks, the overall integration method proved useful
as it began from a process involving the stakeholders from the very beginning of the
problem definition. The stakeholders wanted to understand the method being used
from the start of the decision process, and given that this was an experimental
project an explicit, detailed overview was not possible from commencement. In
future stakeholder involvement processed, the method being used should be clearly
explained and discussed with the stakeholders as early as possible to provide a road
map and end goal. The time and length of the process, while potentially
detrimental, in terms of efficiency, served to build trust amongst the participants,
which in turn permitted a collaborative learning process. For as much as time can
help build relationships and trust, if there are underlying problems, there may be
barriers to building such relationships.
8.2 Deliberation
The deliberation itself, the process of talking through the issues with the affected
parties, helped the parties to understand the issues and brought forth the objectives
upon which the group could agree. It helped to ensure that the problems, as seen
and understood by each representative of the public were brought out. Granted,
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there may still be some issues that remain hidden, yet in combination with an
ongoing deliberative process and prioritization of the major stakeholder concerns,
deliberation can improve understanding and enhance the acceptability of the
recommendation. Although this took the attention away from the disagreements
that may have otherwise formed between particular stakeholders had they gotten
into a discussion of individual values, the true success of the process comes in its
standing over time.
8.2.1 Stakeholder Involvement: Fairness
The substance of the deliberation, the end recommendation, can not be determined
absent the parallel focus on process: similarly, the process, the equal opportunity for
fair and meaningful discussion, can not ensue without the substance to that
discussion. Both Jasanoff(1993) and Stone (1996) raise similar points concerning
the need for a combination of risk assessment and risk management from the start,
and in regards to public rule making, Stone(1996) discusses the various aspects of
precise versus flexible rules which parallels the duality inherent in achieving both
efficiency and fairness.
Assuming that the integration is as accurate as possible, and even in the case that
the initial rankings are not acceptable to all stakeholders, the deliberation enables a
worthwhile discussion of the tradeoffs and RAAs, which results in a consensus on a
recommendation to be made to DOE. For the preferences that are not captured in
the quantitative assessment, the deliberation allows the stakeholders and analysts
to recognize, hear, and incorporate these concerns into the resulting
recommendation. As seen in the deliberation, the verbally expressed preferences
sometimes differ from the elicited preferences. As one analyst pointed out perhaps
we could have used a different hierarchy tree to capture these preferences. We
contend, however, that no matter what set of objectives is used in the integration
analysis, there will always be preferences that manifest themselves in a group
discussion, either because the individual re-evaluates the situation in real time as
he or she gains knowledge from the group, or that a personal situation has caused
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such re-examination; there are numerous other possible causes that cannot be
captured in such a singularly quantitative model. The group memory is also
enhanced through deliberation, as the burden of remembering every past detail does
not fall on a single individual.
The time constraints of a deliberation can affect the level of stakeholder
participation and the ability of the mediator to cover all the important issues,
which, in turn, can affect the quality of the substantive issues of the deliberation.
In this regard, the integration and pre-deliberation preparation helps to focus the
discussion, so that the major contributors to each stakeholders concerns can be
addressed. Additionally, it allows the open discussion of the risks and the
assumptions underlying those risks, ensuring that, although not initially, the
stakeholders and analysts are operating from the same framing of the problem. If
the decision is based solely on the integration, the concerns of the stakeholders
expressed in the deliberation will be overlooked.
Returning to the questions raised in Chapter Five, Was the deliberation fair? Was
the offer to participate genuine and were all the stakeholders given a chance to be
involved? The stakeholders who had participated in the pre-deliberation meetings
were all given the opportunity to take part in the deliberation and during that
deliberation, the mediator guided the discussion to provide each stakeholder the
opportunity to discuss his or her views and interests. Although all the stakeholders
stated that they felt satisfied with the deliberation in this regard, hidden agendas
and concerns cannot be measured. Opportunities were provided to revise the
decision process, however, given the role of the agency in this decision, the power of
the stakeholders is limited. In the deliberation, the stakeholders had the
opportunity to revise the rankings and the form of the recommendation.
Furthermore, they determined the meaning of consensus, and the exact
recommendation to be made. They clearly disagreed with some of the definitions of
consensus that the mediator offered, and subsequently devised a meaning that
suited their recommendation. Constantino (1996) notes that the mediator is to
facilitate the process with the stakeholders as opposed to for them.
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The setting of the goals of the deliberation was done initially by the Team and then
offered for discussion to the stakeholders, who could change them if desired. This
assumes that the stakeholders needed guidance in proposing a set of goals for
deliberation. " If the community is merely providing input, there remains a
question of whether they will ever be satisfied, short of getting what they want-
even if the process is fair. This raises the issue of how meaningful community
involvement can be, and how motivated the community will be, if they only provide
input (and do not design the process) (Ashford, 1996)." For this reason, the decision
and involvement in the decision making process must be discussed, agreed and
acknowledged by the involved stakeholders.
On the other hand, regarding stakeholder selection and fairness of the overall
recommendation to the entire community, particularly in regards to environmental
justice criteria comes into question. For example the "wrong" group of stakeholders
are selected and on the issues of environmental justice, where the performance
measure evaluated in something like percentage of minority adversely affected by
the implementation of the technology as compared to the total population. If the
stakeholder, represent a particularly bias cross section, a decision left entirely in
their hands would result in an inequitable decision. This raises the issue of the role
of the responsible agency, and the responsibility of the agency. At present the
agency retains the final say concerning remediation activities, yet is more likely to
implement a recommendation that was reached by consensus of the stakeholders
and is technically and financially sound.20
8.2.2 Addressing Risk
The deliberative process, from the problem definition phase, addressed the elements
of risk throughout, and ensured that the correct assessments were performed from
the beginning. An integrated deliberative process helped to ensure that the risks
20 Interview with DOE personel, March 9, 1997.
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that were assessed by the analysts were the ones deemed important by the local
community, in the appropriate frame. This process helped to familiarize both the
analysts and the stakeholders with the numerous elements of risk. The
deliberation then, promoted the discussion of the risks and various aspects of
environmental decision making with both neutrals, analysts and stakeholders
which proved effective in establishing a cooperative problem solving forum.
Discussion helps to clarify the perceptions of all parties so that there is agreement
as to how things should be assessed and what types of actions are needed. The
important part is that this agreement is reached through discussion and
collaboration. If the initial framing of the problem was not laid out clearly and
understandably, the participants would be drawing conclusions from differently
perceived foundations of information, which could consequently weakens the overall
process. The one component that could detract from a deliberative process is the
lack of recall concerning the basic assumptions, which influence the framing of the
problem. In risk communication and assessment amongst parties, the assumptions
lie at the core of the problem solving process and therefore need to be reiterated
frequently, and any concerns regarding the assumptions should be addressed
explicitly, as discussed in Chapter 3; and as noted by Ashford (1991), "disjunction
exists partly because agencies look at the problems through the lens of science while
the community uses a different frame." Deliberation based on the substantive risk
assessments and stakeholder interests moves beyond the prior decision making
techniques, bringing together the qualitative and quantitative aspects.
8.2.3 Improvements
When implementing such an integration method it is necessary that the
stakeholders are calibrated, the assumptions are continually restated, in a simple
concise form, the responsibility of the agency and the way the product of the
deliberation is to be used is clearly presented to the stakeholders - ideally, the
agency will be flexible enough to allow the stakeholders to help define the guidelines
of the recommendation and its implementation. Not only should the stakeholders
define the goals and rules of the deliberation, but also take a role in the
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implementation and subsequent activities, in order to establish a true partnership,
as called for by DOE(1997).
8.3 Additional Questions
While this work attempts to address the integration of risk assessments and
stakeholder values, there remain a number of questions which the agency needs to
address when making science intensive decisions, many of which are not only
practical but philosophical in nature. One question that remains unanswered in the
issue of stakeholder involvement, is the selection of the stakeholders. How can the
agency ensure that all the relevant stakeholders are involved? How many
stakeholders should be involved in an agency decision making process?
Once a stakeholder is selected, he or she may be at odds over which organization
they are to represent in the deliberation, if in fact they are members of more than
one organization, as was brought up in the deliberation by stakeholder #6. This
raises some interesting questions about the representation methods used and how
adequate representation in a democracy could be achieved? This question goes hand
and hand with the issue of stakeholder involvement and selection of a stakeholder
involvement model: should the agency select a small group of stakeholders or
proceed with public hearings and large scale community involvement processes
(Gardner, 1989; Community, 1994; Ashford, 1991).
In regards to evaluating the stakeholders' preferences, the issue of quantification, or
more generally speaking, expression of those preferences surfaces. How does the
individual best express his or her feelings and preferences? And how do these differ
in a group or social setting versus an individual setting? Studies have shown that
individuals make decisions difference depending on whether they are deciding for
themselves or for the social welfare (Sagoff, 1996; Kraan et. al, 1991). Despite these
questions decisions must be made which require both agency responsibility and
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honesty. The agency needs to ensure a standard of fairness and environmental
justice in the decision making process.
Other questions that arise concerning environmental decision making are founded
in the underlying values and ethics of society in addressing the environment. Even
in the promulgation of laws, there is a foundation of ethics which guide our laws.
Scientists of all disciplines have begun to question the environmental ethics and the
place of humans in the natural environment. Beyond the fairness and efficiency
questions in the human realm, the deeper questions of environmental ethics should
also play a role in the way decisions are made, if we are in fact to preserve the
natural environment for future generations.
These questions require further investigation and depend to a large extent on the
context of the environmental restoration problem. In light of all these additional
questions, decisions must be made and determining the appropriate method which
adequately addresses the fairness and efficiency issues of both the technical and
social elements of environmental decision making.
8.4 Chapter Summary
The factors that are essential to achieving such a recommendation are trust,
respect, access to resources, opportunity and openness in decision-making,
accountability and proper framing of the problem. In light of these issues, a flexible
recommendation, one which is re-evaluated and able to change as the circumstances
demand is necessary. A decision making method must recognizes the inherent
relationship between technical and social questions in environmental decision
making. By incorporating the lessons learned in future applications, the integration
and deliberation methods tested in this work provide a starting point to improving
the way agencies make decisions.
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CHAPTER 9: FUTURE APPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH
The need for adequate decision making tools which address the risks and values
inherent in environmental decisions will continue as the anthropogenic impacts on
the environment continue. The debate and controversy regarding the appropriate
policies and use of risk assessment persist from the local level to the global level, as
seen at the recent United Nations Conference on the environment (June, 1997) and
the promulgation of the Clean Air Act Amendments.
Policy makers, scientists and stakeholders must address the issues and recognize
the tradeoffs while not compromising fairness in risk laden environmental
decisions. This can be achieved by involving the parties early in the decision
making process, explicitly discussing the objectives of the decision so to clarify the
framing of the problem early. Providing a structure which focuses on the problem
and the interests of the stakeholders can help to move towards an implementable
solution. Although it will not always be possible to satisfy the desires of all
participants fully, providing an open forum with interactive discussion can help
clarify the elements of risk involved in the decision. Individuals while eager to be
involved in the process often do not realize the many tradeoffs that must be made.
Tradeoffs that were once made by the policy maker alone are realized when the
individual is directly involved in decision making. There are other individuals who
take and will continue to take a hands off view in environmental policy making.
The agency and policy makers have a responsibility to conduct decision making in
an open forum, offering the opportunity for participation. With the opportunity for
participation, comes responsibility that needs to be made explicit on all levels.
Uses of this method
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The deliberation methodology devised in this work offers a method that structures
the tradeoffs and issues involved in a risk laden decision problem in order to
facilitate a deliberation. In attempts to better understand and manage the risks
inherent in environmental decisions, this method offers a tool for addressing the
issues, and prioritizing the objectives. It is an appropriate method to be used in
decisions that involve numerous technical elements and multiple objectives. One
instance where such an analytic-deliberative technique could be used is in the
evaluation of the nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain - a decision which
affects multiple stakeholders. It would be difficult however, to implement this
method in circumstances where the agency chooses to involve the entire community
in the environmental decision, rather than a representative working group. This is
due to the detailed quantitative analysis (MAUA and major contributor analysis)
that went into determining each stakeholder's representative ranking of the
alternatives.
The Environmental Protection Agency could utilize this method when determining
specific permitting processes in local communities. For example, in the recent
environmental justice case in Louisiana, a chemical company has proposed to build
a new plant in an area where there are currently six chemical plants. Some within
the community are opposed to the plants for health reasons, while others support
the plant because it will create new jobs. This method of involving the stakeholders
through a deliberative-analytical process, could bring the multiple parties together
and with the aid of a mediator, jointly evaluate the mutual objectives and
preferences to reach an acceptable agreement for all parties, while addressing the
perceived and actual health and environmental risks.
This method is not confined to agency decisions alone. It could well be used in
narrow circumstances, where the value range is not as broad as it was in this
decision. In industry, for example, this method could be used in strategic planning
to evaluate options between multiple departments or facilities or, in a local
community deciding on planning or zoning alternatives. As no one method is
absolute, it must be adapted for different circumstances, yet once the stakeholders
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have been identified, the objectives and intent of the method should be clearly
stated in the beginning of the decision making process.
Areas of Future Research
In order to incorporate multiple stakeholders and risk assessment in the decision
making process, the communication of risks and the level of interaction between the
stakeholders and the agency needs to be examined in greater detail. As was seen in
this project, not all stakeholders have the same level of understanding of the
technical aspects, and yet wanted to be involved. The technical issues need to be
put in context and there remains no one method to accomplish this task. The
interaction between the analysts and stakeholders created the forum for discussion
and clarification throughout the process, however, there was no one method of
communication which was optimal for all stakeholders.
With regards to fairness and efficiency, the appropriate level of stakeholder
involvement must be determined on a case by case basis. As the level of urgency
differs in each decision, the agency must be prepared to assess the situation and
determine the appropriate level of stakeholder involvement. The elicitation and
quantification of preferences as a means of obtaining stakeholder input is another
area which deserves further study. It is important to obtain, whether through
discussion, written expression, or mathematical representation, each stakeholder's
input and yet, there is not one generic mode of self expression. This issue is one
which simply requires time, trust and cooperation.
As science and technological advancements continue, we cannot neglect the need to
consider social implications of these advancements. The link between normative and
behavioral decision theories must be recognized in all social decisions. There is no
right answer to these problem, yet a framework is needed that can help, not replace,
the decision maker.
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APPENDIX 1
Results of the Integration for each Stakeholder:
Mean PI 0.1808 0.1786 0.1771 0.1543 0.1324 0.0711
Standard deviation 0.0149 0.0089 0.0138 0.0156 0.0085 0.0191
Lower 0.1659 0.1697 0.1633 0.1387 0.1239 0.052
Higher 0.1957 0.1875 0.1909 0.1699 0.1409 0.0902
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Stkeholder 4 E F C DB A4
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean PI 0.1353 0.1276 0.1217 0.12 0.1111 0.0529
Standard deviation 0.0062 0.0083 0.0081 0.006 0.0101 0.0126
Lower 0.1291 0.1193 0.1136 0.114 0.101 0.0403
Higher 0.1415 0.1359 0.1298 0.126 0.1212 0.0655
PI and ranking summary for Stakeholder 4
Rankig 1 4 2 o
Mean PI 0.2576 0.2225 0.2157 0.2045 0.1829 0.0936
Standard deviation 0.019 0.0178 0.0224 0.029 0.0142 0.0225
Lower 0.2386 0.2047 0.1933 0.1755 0.1687 0.0711
Higher 0.2766 0.2403 0.2381 0.2335 0.1971 0.1161
PI and ranking summary for Stakeholder 1
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PI and ranking summary for Stakeholder 6
g 1 2 3 4 5 6
PI 0.2052 0.1852 0.1718 0.1281 0.1152 0.0475
Standard deviation 0.0053 0.0079 0.0199 0.0295 0.0219 0.0096
Lower 0.1999 0.1773 0.1519 0.0986 0.0933 0.0379
Higher 0.2105 0.1931 0.1917 0.1576 0.1371 0.0571
PI and ranking summary for Stakeholder 2
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Mean PI 0.1944 0.1594 0.1547 0.1385 0.1297 0.1135
Standard deviation 0.0178 0.0068 0.0123 0.0037 0.0046 0
Lower 0.1766 0.1526 0.1424 0.1348 0.1251 0.1135
Higher 0.2122 0.1662 0.167 0.1422 0.1343 0.1135
A takeholder 5 E B C F D
Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean PI 0.1065 0.091 0.0908 0.0888 0.082 0.0501
Standard deviation 0.0097 0.0151 0.0247 0.014 0.0197 0.0213
Lower 0.0968 0.0759 0.0661 0.0748 0.0623 0.0288
Higher 0.1162 0.1061 0.1155 0.1028 0.1017 0.0714
PI and ranking summary for Stakeholder 5
The information above can be summarized in as follows:
EXPECTED PERFORMANCE INDEX
RAA 3 4 1 6 5 2 Mean
A .0711 .0529 .0936 .1297 .0501 .0475 0.0742
B .1543 .1111 .2045 .1594 .0910 .1718 0.1487
C .1771 .1217 .2157 .1547 .0908 .1281 0.148
D .1786 .1200 .1829 .1385 .0820 .1152 0.1362
E .1324 .1353 .2225 .1135 .1065 .1852 0.1492
F .1808 .1276 .2576 .1944 .0888 .2052 0.1757
RANKINGS
RAA 3 4 1 6 5 2 Mean
A 6 6 6 5 6 6 5.83
B 4 5 4 2 2 3 3.33
C 3 3 3 3 3 4 3.17
D 2 4 5 4 5 5 4.17
E 5 1 2 6 1 2 2.83
F 1 2 1 1 4 1 1.67
Performance index and RAA rankings by stakeholder
Sensitivity Results
Wil.t (routine)
Contaminant Concentration (TCE)
Completion Cost
Transported Waste
Short Term Public Cancer
WHR (fatalities)
WHR (routine)
Long Term Public Cancer
Contaminant Concentration (TCE)
Completion Cost
Implementation Cost
Transported Waste
WHR (injuries)
WHR (routine)
Contaminant Concentration (TCE)
Implementation Cost (not discriminating)
ER Waste (not discriminating)
Long Term Public Cancer Risk
Impact on Local Economy
Completion Cost
Implementation Cost
.1i158
.1330
.096
.061
.07
.056
.028
.094
.055
.110
.037
.015
.0398
.1194
.266
.058
.016
.0525
.040
.059
.037
6
3
8
10
3
2
4
8
6
4
8
B=i=I'>U=)U; A=U
C=D>E>A>B; F=0
F>E>B>>C>D; A=0
F>C>B>A; D=E=0
B=C=D=E=F; A=0
F>A=B=C=D=E=O
B=E=F.C,D; A=0
C=D-E>>A>B; F=0
C=DA~E>B; F=O
E=F>=B>C>D;A=0
F>>B; A,C,D,E=0
A=B=C=F>>D; E=0
F>A=B=C=D=E=O
B=E=F> A=C=D=O
C=D =E>>A>B;F=0
A=B=C=D=F; E=0
A=B=C=D=F; E=0
C=D=E>A>B; F=O
A=E=D=C>B; F=0
E=F=B>C=D>>A=O
F>>B; A=C=D=E=O
Uompared health Impacts
CAH Resources
Changes in Resources
Long Term Public Cancer Risk
Short Term Public accidents
Changes in Ambient Condition
Compared Health Impacts
CAH Resources
Changes in Resources
Short Term Public accidents
Changes in Ambient Condition
Compared Health Impacts
CAH Resources
Changes in Resources
Short Term Public Accidents
Changes in Ambient Condition
Compared Health Impacts
CAH Resources
Contaminant Conc. (Cr)
Changes in Resources
Short Term Public accidents
'Those PMs for which the results of the impacts were such that the stakeholder had no utility for that PM across all RAAs. In other words, all the RAAs
performed equally poor in regards to this measure.
2 This refers to the order of the RAAs under this PM .
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2
3
4
WHR (injuries)
Long Term Public Cancer Risk
Completion Cost
Implementation Cost
Transported Waste
WHR (injuries)
WHR (fatalities)
WHR (routine)
Contaminant Concentration (TCE)
ER Waste
Process Waste
Transported Waste
.0049
.0655
.083
.017
.020
1
1
1
6
6
6
F>>B;A=C=D=E=O
C=D=E>A>B; F=0
E=F=B>C=D>>A
F=B>A-C-D;E=0
A=B=CF;D,E=O
Compared Health Impacts
CAH Resources
Changes in Resources
Worker Health Risk(routine)
Short Term Cancer Risks
Short Term Public accidents
Changes in Ambient Condition
Compared Health Impacts
CAH Resources
Changes in Resources
Worker Health Risk(routine)
Short Term Cancer Risks
Short Term Public accidents
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APPENDIX 2
Deliberation Presentation Material
Pre-deliberation Material that was sent to each stakeholder:
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 1
Our analysis of your input tells us that you prefer alternative F (no action) because
F does not involve workers and, thus, avoids worker health risks. F does not
generate wastes of any kind, although it leaves the contaminated material in the
ground. F is obviously cost-free.
You appear to prefer C and E less than F. Compared to F, both C and E provide a
substantial reduction in groundwater contamination risks, but C and E do not fare
as well in worker health risk. Unlike F, both C and E require workers who are
inevitably exposed to both transportation and contaminant risks. C also has a
rather high completion cost. However, E involves a greater amount of waste
transported off-site, because E's technology is based on excavation followed by off-
site treatment and disposal.
You seem to prefer B slightly less than E and C, perhaps because B yields a higher
concentration of contaminant in the groundwater as a result of the on-site
remediation.
D requires a greater volume of transported waste and a higher completion cost than
B. This is primarily because D requires transportation off-site. For this reason, you
apparently prefer D less than B.
You seem to rate alternative A (in-situ vitrification and soil vapor extraction)
inferior to the other RAAs because A has high completion costs as well as worker
risk. The high completion costs result from the technologies used. Furthermore,
this alternative releases a greater amount of chromium particulates during the
remediation process, and this exposure puts the workers at greater risk.
The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below. The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the
RAAs. These rankings are based on the performance indices (PI), which are
numerical measures of your overall preferences. The higher the PI value, the more
preferable the RAA is to you.
155
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. Uncertainty analyses on
your performance outputs of the RAAs suggest that the preferences regarding F
(your most preferred) and regarding D and A as the least preferred, are stable
(relatively certain). E, C, and B only reveal small differences in mean PI values, so
each of these could be second best within the uncertainties.
ower bound 0.2386 0.2047 0.1933 0.1755 0.1687 0.0711
igher bound 0.2766 0.2403 0.2381 0.2335 0.1971 0.1161
Mean PI 0.2576 0.2225 0.2157 0.2045 0.1829 0.0936
Std deviation 0.019 0.0178 0.0224 0.029 0.0142 0.0225
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 2
Our analysis of your input tells us that you seem to prefer alternative F (no action).
This probably is because F does not lead to short-term public health risk from
accidents (in comparison to the other RAAs), and you have indicated particular
concern for the health and safety of the public. In addition, F has no
implementation costs.
You evidently prefer E less than F since E requires transportation of wastes. This
contributes to E's lower performance with respect to implementation costs, as the
number of trucks and workers involved are greater for this type of remediation.
Although E is better than F in the removal of contamination, the fact that E
requires waste transportation leads to a poor performance in the short-term public
health risk from accidents.
Your preference for B is similar to E. B involves remediation activities on-site; this
reduces the amount of transported waste and, thus, leads to significantly lower
costs. On the other hand, the long-term public risk of cancer from B is significantly
higher than E.
C and D appear considerably less attractive to you because C and D have higher
completion costs. These higher costs can be attributed to the thermal desorption
treatment and the disposal of the residuals. Furthermore, D requires
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transportation of the treatment residuals off-site, which increases the total cost of
completion.
You evidently have the lowest preference for A due to its poor performance under
worker and public health risks, as well as completion costs. The risks for A are
higher due to the fact that chromium particulates are released from the stack and
volatized (vaporized) during the process of in-situ vitrification.
The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below.
The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the RAAs. These
rankings are based on the performance indices (PI), which are numerical measures
of your overall preferences. The higher the PI value, the more preferable the RAA is
to you.
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. Uncertainty analysis on the
performance output of the RAAs have shown that your preferences are quite stable
(reasonably definite).
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 3
Our analysis of your input tells us that you slightly prefer alternative F (no action).
This is perhaps because F does not cause any worker injuries, although F does not
solve the problem of groundwater contamination. Worker injuries have a significant
impact on the performance of the other RAAs due to the number of workers involved
in the remediation of the site. Transportation of the waste is the major contributor
to potential injuries, specifically in C, D, and E.
You evidently regard C and D almost as well as F, primarily because C and D
remove a substantial amount of the contaminants. This may balance the higher
risk of worker injuries with C and D, which is inevitable higher than F's no action.
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Lower bound 0.1999 0.1773 0.1519 0.0986 0.0933 0.0379
Higher bound 0.2105 0.1931 0.1917 0.1576 0.1371 0.0571
Mean PI 0.2052 0.1852 0.1718 0.1281 0.1152 0.0475
Std deviation 0.0053 0.0079 0.0199 0.0295 0.0219 0.009(
B can be considered as average; you regard B basically as well as C and D in all
categories except contaminant removal. C and D both involve excavation, while B is
based on in-situ stabilization for the metals and bioremediation for the organics.
B's technologies result in a lower removal efficiency for both contaminants. On the
other hand, B has a lower completion cost.
You apparently have a lower preference for E because the implementation cost is
greatest among all RAAs. Additionally, E results in a significant amount of
environmental restoration waste and transported waste as compared to C and D.
This is because E requires off-site treatment and disposal of the contaminants. All
of the contaminated soil is excavated and sent off-site for disposal; there is no
attempt in E to separate or isolate the actual contaminant. This leads to higher
volumes of waste, which need a greater and more expensive transportation capacity.
A is evidently your least preferred alternative. This RAA involves in-situ
vitrification which causes chromium particulates to be released from the stack and
volatized (vaporized) during the remediation process. This exposure puts the
workers at substantially greater risk.
The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below.
The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the RAAs. These
rankings are based on the performance indexes (PI), which are numerical measures
of your overall preferences. The higher the PI value, the more preferable the RAA is
to you.
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. Uncertainty analyses on the
performance output of the RAAs suggest that your preferences are rather stable
(relatively certain). They also suggest that your preferences for C, D, and F are not
markedly different.
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lSbehlder3, F D B. A
Lower bound 0.1659 0.1697 0.1633 0.1387 0.1239 0.052
Higher bound 0.1957 0.1875 0.1909 0.1699 0.1409 0.0902
Mean PI 0.1808 0.1786 0.1771 0.1543 0.1324 0.0711
Std deviation 0.0149 0.0089 0.0138 0.0156 0.0085 0.0191
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 4
Our analysis of your input tells us that your most preferred alternative is E
(excavation followed by off-site treatment and disposal). The main reason appears
to be that, as with F (no action), E has a low completion cost. At the same time, E
has a more substantial impact on the local economy. The local economy benefits
from the revenue generated by jobs, taxes, and the purchase of goods and services.
Moreover, E performs better than F in terms of long-term public cancer risk.
Indeed, E removes a significant amount of the contaminant from the soil and,
therefore, results in a lower long-term cancer risk.
You appear to like F (no action) nearly as well as E, except that F has no impact on
the local economy and has a higher risk of long-term cancer due to the remaining
contamination. An important positive aspect of F is that it has a lower risk of
worker injuries than all other RAAs. Other less significant discriminators between
F and the other RAAs are the absences of implementation costs and transported or
generated wastes.
You show lower preferences for C and D, which have significantly higher completion
costs than E. The higher completion costs are due to the type of technology
employed. Although C and D perform better on the performance measures
regarding environmental restoration waste and transported waste, E does
significantly better on the amount of process waste generated.
Your results indicate that B is slightly less preferable than C and D to you. RAA B
costs less but results in a lower impact on the local economy. B performs well in
terms of worker injuries, yet gives rise to the second highest long-term public cancer
risk. As transportation is the primary contributor to worker injuries, this tradeoff
is a result of the fact that B does not transport any of the contaminated media off-
site. On the other hand, since the contaminant remains on-site, it poses a long-term
threat of cancer risk.
You appear to prefer A much less than all other RAAs. A has a lower
implementation cost and completion cost. But, due to the fact that chromium
particulates are released during the in-situ remediation process, the risk to
individual worker health is significantly larger than that of other RAAs.
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The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below.
The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the RAAs. These
rankings are based on the performance indices (PI), which are numerical measures
of your overall preferences. The higher your PI value, the more preferable the RAA
is to you.
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. The uncertainty analyses on
your performance output for the RAAs show that your rankings are rather stable
(relatively certain).
takholder4)a E, F, <C D
Lower bound 0.1291 0.1193 0.1136 0.114 0.101 0.0403
Higher bound 0.1415 0.1359 0.1298 0.126 0.1212 0.0655
Mean PI 0.1353 0.1276 0.1217 0.12 0.1111 0.0529
Std deviation 0.0062 0.0083 0.0081 0.006 0.0101 0.0126
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 5
Our analysis of your input tells us that you have a slight preference for alternative
E (excavation followed by off-site treatment and disposal). Your primary reasons
seem to be the low completion costs for this alternative and the lower long-term
public risk of cancer.
You appear to prefer B, C and F slightly less than E. Although they perform better
with respect to the programmatic objectives for waste minimization and have lower
implementation costs, they pose a significant risk of long-term cancer since the
contaminated matter is left on-site. B and F have completion costs similar to those
of E; however, B and F perform worse when it comes to long-term public cancer risk.
On the other hand, C is more expensive than B and F, yet C performs comparably to
E in long-term cancer risk.
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D results in greater transported waste since, unlike C, it requires the off-site
disposal of the treatment residuals.
You apparently rank A (in-situ vitrification and soil vapor extraction) inferior to the
other RAAs because A has higher completion costs as well as a greater long-term
public cancer risk. Furthermore, this alternative releases a greater amount of
chromium particulates during the in-situ vitrification process, and this exposure
puts the workers at greater risk.
The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below.
The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the RAAs. These
rankings are based on the performance indices (PI), which are numerical measures
of your overall preferences. The higher your PI value, the more preferable the RAA
is to you.
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. The uncertainty analyses on
your performance output of the RAAs suggest that your rankings of alternatives F,
B, and C are not markedly different. The small differences among the mean PI
values are largely overshadowed by the uncertainties. Alternatives F and B show a
somewhat lower uncertainty than C. Your preferences for E and A are sufficiently
stable (relatively certain).
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INDIVIDUAL RESULTS - STAKEHOLDER 6
Our analysis of your input tells us that you seem to prefer alternative F (no action)
because F does not generate waste of any kind, although it leaves the contaminated
material in the ground. F is obviously cost-free, and F does not involve workers, so
there are no worker health risks.
You appear to prefer B and C less than F because B and C produce significantly
more process waste than F. B and C perform similarly to F with respect to
transported waste and environmental restoration waste generated (negligible
amounts in both cases). B and C do, however, perform better than F with respect to
groundwater contamination, due to the fact that F does not remove or treat any of
the contaminated environmental media. On the other hand, in the remediation
process, both B and C produce significant worker risks.
You seem to prefer D less than B and C because the treatment of the residuals
occurs off-site and, thus, D requires greater transportation activity. Transportation
of the waste contributes significantly to worker risks. Thus, D does not perform as
well with respect to either transported waste or worker injury risks.
You appear to regard A as similar to B in most regards. However, the individual
worker health risk is greater in A due to the fact that chromium particulates are
released from the stack and vaporized during the treatment process.
E is your least preferred alternative, evidently because of the large amounts of
transported waste and waste generated by environmental restoration, which also
give rise to more significant worker health risks. This is primarily a result of the
excavation which is part of the remediation process. Although RAA E removes the
contaminants, transportation has a risk of fatalities which is two times higher than
other activities.
The actual numerical results from which the above insights were gleaned are given
below. The table and graph show your numerical results and rankings for the
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ower bound 0.0968 0.0759 0.0661 0.0748 0.0623 0.0288
igherbound 0.1162 0.1061 0.1155 0.1028 0.1017 0.0714
ean PI 0.1065 0.091 0.0908 0.0888 0.082 0.0501
Std deviation 0.0097 0.0151 0.0247 0.014 0.0197 0.0213
RAAs. These rankings are based on the performance indices (PI), which are
numerical measures of your overall preferences. The higher the PI value, the more
preferable the RAA is to you.
Uncertainties in the PI values are indicated by the standard deviations in the table,
as well as by the spread between low and high bounds. Uncertainty analyses on the
performance outputs of the RAAs suggest that your preferences are stable
(relatively certain).
Lower bound 0.1766 0.1526 0.1424 0.1348 0.1251 0.1135
Higher bound 0.2122 0.1662 0.167 0.1422 0.1343 0.1135
Mean PI 0.1944 0.1594 0.1547 0.1385 0.1297 0.1135
Std deviation 0.0178 0.0068 0.0123 0.0037 0.0046 0
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